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University of Thessaly (UTH)

Οι μεθοδολογίες δυναμικής βελτιστοποίησης και τα διαφορικά παίγνια στην οικονομική θεωρία: εφαρμογές στα οικονομικά του περιβάλλοντος

Abstract

dc:description

Abstract This dissertation makes a study of whether dynamic optimization and differential games are applicable to environmental economics.The first part of this work is dedicated to the known today dynamic methodologies of economics, i.e., the calculus of variation, optimal control, and dynamic programming, which are dynamic optimization methods of one person or of one group of persons that cooperates, and the differential games which is the case of at least two non-cooperative players. In both cases, the involved parties maximize their reward or minimize their losses.The Calculus of Variations is a branch of mathematics that dates back to ancient Greek, still known as “the isoperimetric inequality”. The development of this method gave solutions to problems in geometric optics (Fermat 1662), problems of the bodies' motion inside liquids (Newton 1685) as well as the solution of brachistochrone problem (Galilei 1638). The introduction of Calculus of Variations in Economic Theory became in the twentieth century due to studies of Ramsey (1928) and Hotelling (1931). Hotelling’s contribution is rather a foundation of environmental economics since he first introduces the problem of “optimal social value of an exhaustible resource” which in turn implies the exhaustion of the inputs used during the production process.In this section, we present dynamic economic models such as the dynamic monopoly model (Evans, 1924) and the model of adjustment of investment plans (Eisner and Strotz, 1963), and at the time we propose an unpublished dynamic model of consumption-investment.The historical evolution of the methodologies of dynamic Economics was rapid during the past century. Optimal control theory becomes the dominant method of dynamical economics due to its minimal cost of calculation (compared with the calculus of variations method). Problems interrelated with calculation costs are for example the fact that the differential equation that describes the motion of the state variable lies inside the maximized functional (in calculus of variations), while with the optimal control this variable's motion is treated with the simple introduction of two simple variables i.e., the control and the costate variables.Optimal control is based on the maximum principle founded by the work of Pontryagin (1952) and his associates, while there exists a little contribution by Hestness. In the second section of this first chapter, we give an economic interpretation of the variables involved in the maximum principle applied in a model of pollutants generation during the production process. We also propose a model in which a productive firm uses as inputs capital and an exhaustible resource that is mined. Moreover, we examine the stability of the equilibrium strategies in various proposed models of renewable resources. We continue with the method of Dynamic Programming which is the more complete therefore the more modern of the dynamic optimization methods. Dynamic programming is based on the principles of recursion and embodiment. The latter means that instead of finding the necessary conditions for the solution the methodology offers the necessary conditions in order to conclude that the dynamic problem that arose from the Hamiltion–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation has a solution and therefore an optimal control. This methodology thanks to the way that faces a dynamic problem is suitable for feedback rules construction, therefore for a time consistent equilibrium strategies. The above feedback strategies are known as closed-loop strategies as well. In this section of that chapter, we moreover propose a model of monopolistic extraction of an exhaustible resource for which we found the feedback equilibrium strategies, which are in turn time consistent equilibrium strategies. In the same section, we propose a model of renewable resources extraction which is solved with an alternative way of the basic HJB equation, but with time-consistent equilibrium strategies again. We continue with the differential games in a separate chapter. As differential games we introduce these dynamic games which are evolved in continuous (instead of discrete) time. In the spirit of Dockner et al (2000) we introduce the notions of Nash equilibrium for this class of games. Then, we propose a differential game of non-renewable resources extraction among N players and we found the time-consistent equilibrium strategies for that game.Continuing with the games, we introduce the meaning of Stackelberg equilibrium in differential games and we found the conditions under which the latter hierarchical equilibrium achieves time consistency, a necessary property for the economic acceptability of the results. Moreover, we examine the important situation under which the two types of equilibrium (Nash and Stackelberg) coincide, i.e., the first mover advantage disappears. In order to clarify the above situation of equilibrium coincidence we propose a dynamic model of non-renewables extraction with a special structure of the objective functional at which, in the solution process, Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium coincide.The second part of this work proposes dynamic models concerning public economics, the economics of taxation, and environmental economics. Specifically, in the second part, we propose dynamic models from the field of exhaustible resources, dynamic models concerning how pollution influences the market factors, i.e. consumer surplus, the prices of the goods, and the demand elasticity. These models are related to the policies which every regulator can follow without any taxes imposed, as the incentives for private investments in green production are given through tax exemptions. The proposed models satisfy Nash or Stackelberg prerequisites of dynamical equilibrium. Special emphasis has been given to the notion of time consistency in order to extract economically acceptable conclusions. For the latter task, we make use of the HJB equation, which plays a central role during the solution process. The maximum principle is used as well in cases in which the players cooperate or in cases the regulator has the central role.In the third chapter, we propose a dynamic game model of extraction non-renewable resources, in which the players of the game are symmetric while the utility functions are related to partial or absolute risk aversion. We solve the above model and found the feedback (time consistent) strategies, and we extract some useful conclusions and formulate propositions in accordance with the economic theory.The second chapter of the second part of this work studies the implications of pollution in the market factors. Specifically, we propose a dynamic game of N oligopolistic firms in that they produce and sell a homogenous product for which the curvature of the inverse demand affects the demand elasticity, the consumer surplus, and also the reservation prices of that goods. The involved firms undertake counter-pollution activities in order to augment the market size through the reservation price. We found that the equilibrium strategies of both closed and open loops hinge upon demand curvature, while the free-riding problem emerged. Next, we study the regulatory policies over pollution in Cournot–Nash competition. We propose a non-linear quadratic game model of polluting firms and every polluting firm has at her disposal an allowed amount of pollutants that can emit, which is depending on the size of each firm. We solve the proposed model, and we found the closed-loop strategies which are time consistent. Specifically, we found that a marginal increment of pollutants is possible to yield decrement in the discounted revenues of the involved firms. Moreover, we found, that the discounted revenues of each firm are possible to increment if the total amount of the allowed pollution decrement.In the next chapter of this work, we propose incentives for investment in green production for a country according to several environmental conditions, e.g. the Kyoto condition. More precisely we propose a hierarchical (Stackelberg) dynamic game model at which the central planning announces first at the beginning of the game the tax factor for the polluting firms in order to promote counter-pollution actions. The firms, on the other side, invest in counter-pollution technologies having the incentive of tax exemption for this investment. We found that the above Stackelberg game not only produced time-consistent outcomes, but the has the subgame perfection property that is more strictly property, in economic terms, than time consistency. Finally, comparing the outcomes of the hierarchical game model with the outcomes of the social planning model we found that the social planning strategy is more effective than the game model strategies in the sense of social welfare, i.e. social planning brings more welfare to the citizens.The last chapter of this work is dedicated to the studies of pollution models as unified ecological-economic models. We propose a model in which the players are producers of agricultural products which maximize their utility by making use of polluting inputs, i.e. polluting fertilizers and some chemicals. These actions of the farmers conflict with groups of citizens which are they wish for clean environmental quality. Special attention has been made to the pollutant's internal feedback according to the literature of the last five years. We examine the optimal tax levy in the case of public counter-pollution

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Thessaly (UTH)
Year dc:date
2009

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Papageorgiou, Georgios
  • Παπαγεωργίου, Γεώργιος

Subjects

dc:subject × 14

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/33799

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Papageorgiou, Georgios; Παπαγεωργίου, Γεώργιος. Οι μεθοδολογίες δυναμικής βελτιστοποίησης και τα διαφορικά παίγνια στην οικονομική θεωρία: εφαρμογές στα οικονομικά του περιβάλλοντος. University of Thessaly (UTH), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/33799