Back to search

University of Crete (UOC)

Firm - union objectives in a strategic context

Abstract

dc:description

The present thesis is classified in the Labour Economics’ field of interest, using analytical tools from the theoretical framework of Industrial Organization and Game Theory. It is divided into three different sections: Chapter 1: Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)In a five-stage game, a duopoly with competition a la Cournot is analyzed, where a local firm produces and sells the product exclusively in the domestic market, while a multinational one competes either via international trade, or implementing FDI in the host country.The research focuses on whether the unionization structure of the labour market (decentralized or centralized) can be used as a policy tool in order to induce FDI.The results reveal that the institutional setup of the labour market may - and under certain circumstances – consist an affective policy tool in order to attract or deter FDI. Chapter 2: Union Oligopoly Bargaining and Undeclared LabourThe research focuses on the nature of undeclared work and its impact on the market, as well as on the social welfare. The basic idea concerns the opportunity cost between taxation and social security contributions when undeclared work is applied.The analysis includes different aspects of the market (exogenous wages, decentralized collective bargaining, individual negotiations, progressive and proportional taxation of companies and workers, direct and indirect taxation, etc.) with different analytical tools (maximizing I / O models, benchmarking model, analysis in pure strategies).The findings of the survey indicate that the ratio between tax rate and the rate of social security contributions may effectively be used as a strategic tool in order firms and workers to comply endogenously and internally, eliminating thereby the phenomenon of undeclared work. Moreover, the research revealed new policy tools and highlighted all Nash equilibria as well as all possible unilateral deviations. Chapter 3: Efficiency of Price Competition Versus Quantity Competition in Unionized OligopolyIn a union-duopoly decentralized bargaining context it is shown that prior to the realization of any employment and production plans firms and unions in each firm/union pair may collectively decide about their bargaining agenda, e.g., whether they will subsequently negotiate about only wages (“Right-to-Manage”) or about both wages and employment (“Efficient Bargains”). It is shown that under price competition in the product market the equilibrium bargaining agendas would always regard only wages. Under quantity competition, however, and provided that the union bargaining power is low enough, one firm/union pair may agree on Efficient Bargains while the other pair agrees on Right-to-Manage. In contrast to conventional wisdom the findings suggest that, if sufficient product differentiation among firms exists, social welfare can be higher under quantity competition than under price competition − the role of unions in that being critical.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Crete (UOC)
Year dc:date
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Mamakis, Stefanos
  • Μαμάκης, Στέφανος

Subjects

dc:subject × 18

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/36149

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Mamakis, Stefanos; Μαμάκης, Στέφανος. Firm - union objectives in a strategic context. University of Crete (UOC), 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/36149