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Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)

Market structure and economic policy

Abstract

dc:description

The subject of reforms and economic policy has been the last years the center of the scientific research useful for policy makers and governments all over the world. However, it became top priority after the recent economic crisis of 2008, especially for Europe. We know that in several OECD countries, and mainly continental Europe, market imperfections influence significantly the effects and the transmission mechanism of the attempted economic policy measures. Within the above framework, often theoretical studies do not emphasize the distributional issues derived from various policy measures. In fact, the general equilibrium effects of changes in economic policy have mostly been directed towards the social welfare in models with a representative agent. Possible extensions of the above literature has been the main motivation of this thesis. This thesis is about market structure imperfections and economic policy. It studies both structural and fiscal policy reforms in economies with imperfectly competitive product and labour markets in a dynamic (stochastic) general equilibrium models (D(S)GE). We use standard numerical methods in the recent literature to solve, calibrate and simulate the models below. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 presents a good overview of the main models in trade union literature and the vehicle is the rather standard DGE model that incorporates heterogeneous agents (entrepreneurs and workers) and imperfectly competitive product and labour markets. Concerning the structure of the labour market institutions it is known that wage and employment relations can be modeled in different ways and according to this we have the right to manage model (RTM) and the efficient bargaining (EB), see Lawson 2010, Booth 1995. Thus, we will first consider a world of Nash efficient bargaining solutions. There are two reasons for this. The efficient bargaining concept allows wages to be bargained off the labour demand curve, which implies that an increase in wages could be achieved without an immediate decrease in employment and second there are some empirical studies (Dobbelaere, 2004) arguing in favor of an efficient bargaining model as the appropriate explanation of wage bargaining. Then we move to the RTM in which only the wage is subject to negotiation while employment is left to be determined by firms unilaterally. There are reasons to justify a lower power of unions in bargaining over employment since only wage contracts are legally binding in most labour markets and thus convincing firms to remain on the contract curve for employment too, needs appropriate punishment strategies (Petrakis and Vlassis, 2000). Thus, it is likely that unions are less able to bargain over employment and we have also evidence that in Europe trade unions so far have been successful to maintain their strong position as wage setting institutions (Vogel, 2011). Since the case for structural reforms is particularly acute in Europe, it is important to have a model that captures this feature (Bokan and Hallett, 2006).Chapter 2 studies the implications of higher flexibility, or liberalization, in product and labour markets. We study both efficiency and distribution implications. The vehicle is a DGE model that incorporates heterogeneous agents (entrepreneurs and workers) and imperfectly competitive product and labour markets. The combination of market power in the product market with agents’ heterogeneity influences the political feasibility of structural reforms. The model is solved numerically employing parameter values and fiscal data from the Euro Area. Chapter 3 employs a DGE model that incorporates heterogeneous agents (entrepreneurs and workers) and imperfectly competitive product and labour markets, augmented with a relatively rich public sector, to examine the quantitative macroeconomic and welfare implications of fiscal reforms in Euro Area. It contributes to the literature on the effects of tax-spending policy reforms. In particular, it analyses the effects of: (i) changes in the composition of tax rates; and (ii) changes in public investment met by adjustment in one of the distorting tax rate. It is explored how these reforms affect the economy both in long run and along the transition path to a new post-reform steady state. A qualitative assessment of the welfare effects associated with the alternative policy reform is also provided. Chapter 4 builds on the work done by Maffezzoli (2001) and studies two models: (i) a Walrasian model with indivisible labour market and endogenous growth, generated by a simple learning-by-doing process, built on Hansen (1985) and Rogerson and Wright (1988) and (ii) following Daveri and Maffezzoli (2000), a non-Walrasian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with indivisible labour and endogenous growth, where unemployment is generated by monopolistic unions. The main question is if the model with the non-Walrasian features, exhibits a comparative advantage over the competitive one, in explaining the Greek business cycle. We calibrate the above models to reproduce several long run features of the Greek economy. We focus on the impulse response functions, the standard business cycle statistics, and the ability to reproduce the cyclical components of the main macroeconomic variables.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Year dc:date
2015

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Koliousi, Panagiota
  • Κολιούση, Παναγιώτα

Subjects

dc:subject × 8

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/36204

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Koliousi, Panagiota; Κολιούση, Παναγιώτα. Market structure and economic policy. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB), 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/36204