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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

The DEMOS family of e-voting systems: end - to - end verifiable elections in the standard model

Abstract

dc:description

During the last decades, electronic voting (e-voting) systems have emerged as promising technologies for carrying out democratic procedures in the Digital Age. Their major advantages comprise the facilitation of participation of social groups with considerable physical barriers, reduction of the election cost and acceleration of the set up, voting and tally phases during an election execution. By today, e-voting systems have been used in several countries either in pilot executions or binding elections at a municipality or national level. Nonetheless, they have been subject to occasionally trenchant criticism, mainly due to the disquiet about potential securitythreats caused by the amount of power now transferred to the machines.This PhD thesis addresses the prospect of e-voting from the viewpoint of contemporarycryptography. Its main contribution is the introduction of e-voting systems that achieveend-to-end verifiability in the standard model for the first time. End-to-end verifiability is astrong security property suggesting that the voters can verify the integrity of the electionprocedure without putting trust in any administration authority. End-to-end verifiability inthe standard model denotes that verification is executed without assuming any trustedsetup. Prior to this thesis, all top-tier e-voting systems (e.g. SureVote, JCJ, Prêt à Voter,Helios, Scantegrity, etc.) assumed honesty of the voting clients, the random oracle model,or the existence a randomness beacon to achieve end-to-end verifiability. Therefore, until recently, the feasibility of end-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model remained an open question.The above question is answered affirmatively in this thesis with the introduction of theDEMOS-A and DEMOS-2 e-voting systems. The two systems follow different approacheswith respect to their design and have complementary benefits and weaknesses. In the core of both systems, is a novel mechanism that extracts the randomness required for verification from the entropy generated by the voters, when they engage in the voting phase. This entropy is internal with respect to the election environment, therefore the need for trusting an outer source of randomness is removed. For a concrete security analysis of DEMOS-A and DEMOS-2, this thesis brings in a strongcryptographic framework that adds to the literature a state-of-the-art methodologyfor the study of e-voting systems and can be seen as an independent contribution. Thesaid framework is extended by modelling e-voting systems as ceremonies, inspired by the work of Ellison in 2007. In an e-voting ceremony, the human entities are analysed separately from their associated devices and operate as finite state machines (transducers) with limited power. As a case study of an e-voting ceremony, this thesis investigates the security of the well known Helios e-voting system by providing formal proofs as well as evaluations based onreal-world and simulation data.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2016

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Zacharias, Thomas
  • Ζαχαρίας, Θωμάς

Subjects

dc:subject × 14

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/38592

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Zacharias, Thomas; Ζαχαρίας, Θωμάς. The DEMOS family of e-voting systems: end - to - end verifiable elections in the standard model. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/38592