Abstract
dc:descriptionThis thesis’ subject under negotiation is the recipience difficulty of the SA type of company to recruit personal characteristics in its internal relations and the boundaries of this option.The thesis is organized into three chapters. In the first chapter the SA corporate type under the Greek Law 2190/1920 is being presented. The internal structure of this company type and the mandatory settings of the intra patternships are discussed in detail.In the second chapter the interpretation of the concept “private company” under the company type of SA is being specified. The real situations with which SA acquires private data and is shaped as “private” are identified, while the concept of this company form is opposed to the “close corporation” form. The ways of recruiting personal data in its internal relations are determined (through statutory regulations, de facto, by shareholder agreements or by making group of companies). The correspondence of the share with the voting rights is examined, by quoting arguments and literature elaboration, and the momentum issues of the shareholder and the carriers of the real power in the private SA company form are being analyzed. The research also extends to the companies listed in the stock market, by analyzing the power structures generated by the coexistence of different categories of managers and shareholders.The third chapter, which constitutes the synthesis section of this thesis, sets out the prevention and pathogenesis removal mechanisms in the private SA company form. The classic mechanisms are being developed towards the obligations and responsibilities of the company administrators, by requiring diligent management and duty of loyalty. The inadequacy of the posed legislative mechanisms is noted concerning the obligations and the responsibility of the shareholder that holds, from the specific position each time and with the specific each time momentum, substantial influence and/or control in the corporate administration. Duty of loyalty is proposed as a complementary (preventing and suppressive) regulatory mechanism. The shareholder’s duty of loyalty is affirmed both towards the company and other shareholders, with arguments for its foundation not only regarding the dominant shareholder but also with respect to the shareholder that cannot influence the company’s decision making, by his company membership, which is an institution of such a potential, individual or collective, decision momentum.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2013
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Γκρίτζαλης, Γεώργιος
Subjects
dc:subject × 20- Προσωποπαγής Α.Ε.
- Προσωπική/κλειστή/μικρή Α.Ε.
- Καταστατική ρυθμική Α.Ε.
- Υποχρέωση πίστης και θεμελιωσή της
- Σύγκρουση συμφερόντων σε Α.Ε.
- Δυναμική και θέση του μετόχου Α.Ε.
- Εταιρικός τύπος και εταιρική μορφή
- Φορείς συμγερόντων σε Α.Ε.
- Close corporation/closely held corporation
- Prvate company
- Conflict of interestes
- Fiduciary duties of shareholdres and directors /duty of logalty
- Shareholder and stakeholder theory
- One share-one vote and shareholder power
- Corporate contract
- Offectio societatis
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Νομική Επιστήμη
- Social Sciences
- Law
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/38662