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University of Thessaly (UTH)

Analysis and evaluation of pricing mechanisms in markets with non-convexities with reference to electricity markets

Abstract

dc:description

This thesis addresses the problem of pricing and bidding in markets with non-convexities. This problem, which lies at the interface of economics, operations research, and market design, has attracted renewed attention in the context of electricity markets, most notably day-ahead wholesale electricity markets where unit commitment costs and capacity constraints give rise to non-convexities. The thesis is structured in two parts. Each part aims at furthering our understanding in each of the two areas — pricing and bidding — by employing exact analysis and numerical comparisons and evaluation. In the first part, we start by considering a market in which suppliers with asymmetric capacities and asymmetric marginal and fixed costs compete to satisfy a deterministic and inelastic demand of a commodity in a single period. The suppliers bid their costs to an auctioneer who determines the optimal allocation and the resulting payments, a typical situation in deregulated electricity markets. Under classical marginal-cost pricing, the non-convexity of the total cost may result in losses for some suppliers, as they may fail to recover their fixed cost through commodity payments only. To address this problem, various pricing schemes that lift the price above marginal cost and/or provide side-payments (uplifts) have been proposed in the literature. We review several of these schemes, also proposing a new variant, in a two-supplier setting. We derive closed-form expressions for the price, uplifts, and profits that each scheme generates, which enable us to analytically compare these schemes along these three dimensions. Our analysis is complemented with numerical results. We extend some of our analytical comparisons to the case of more than two suppliers and discuss and add to extant numerical comparisons for this case. Finally,we close the numerical investigation by considering an actual market setting, based on the Greek wholesale electricity market. In the second part, we study the bidding behavior of market participants in markets with non-convexities under different pricing schemes (or mechanisms) that use marginal pricing and provide side-payments to the participants after the market is cleared (ex post) to recover any losses they may have based on their costs or bids. We also explore the implications that each scheme has on the incentives of the participants. Initially, we identify and discuss equilibrium outcomes for a stylized duopoly with non-convex costs, complementing and extending the scarce results that exist in the related literature. The simple stylized duopoly is useful for identifying equilibrium outcomes and revealing key properties of the considered mechanisms. We also explore the bidding behavior of participants under different recovery mechanisms that maintain marginal pricing and reimburse the participants that exhibit losses, for more complicated market designs, such as actual electricity markets, where finding Nash equilibria becomes practically infeasible. The mechanisms that we consider differ in the type and amount of recovery payments; some are variants or generalizations of the mechanisms considered in the context of the duopoly model. To evaluate the bidding strategy behavior of the participating units under each mechanism, we propose a methodology that employs an iterative numerical algorithm aimed at finding the joint optimal bidding strategies of the profit-maximizing units. We apply this methodology and evaluate the performance and incentive compatibility properties of the considered mechanisms on a test case model representing the Greek joint energy/reserve day-ahead electricity market. The results allow us to gain insights and draw useful conclusions on the performance and incentive compatibility properties of the recovery mechanisms.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Thessaly (UTH)
Year dc:date
2016

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Andrianesis, Panagiotis
  • Ανδριανέσης, Παναγιώτης

Subjects

dc:subject × 14

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/38948

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Andrianesis, Panagiotis; Ανδριανέσης, Παναγιώτης. Analysis and evaluation of pricing mechanisms in markets with non-convexities with reference to electricity markets. University of Thessaly (UTH), 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/38948