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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

The right to democratic belonging: a judicial review theory with a special reference to affirmative action programs in higher education: a constitutional approach

Abstract

dc:description

The thesis interprets the right to equal protection of the laws and suggests certain criteria for its judicial review. I have suggested the Right to Democratic Belonging which has three inherent rights; the rights to secure, free identity and minimum comfortable belonging in a democratic society. The suggested judicial review theory is composed of a criterion of standing, first and second stage of the analysis of the scope of the right and criteria for justification of the limits of the rights in a democratic society. It is a suggestion for a substantive, purposive and contextual interpretation of the right and case law, legal and political theory have contributed to this suggestion. The second part of the thesis is the main analysis of the broad scope of the Right to Democratic Belonging and the respective criteria of judicial review. The right to equal belonging is the broad scope and the general inherent right in the ultimate Right to Democratic Belonging. The right to equal belonging is composed of three more specific inherent rights: the rights to secure, free identity and minimum comfortable belonging in a community of equals. Upon this theretical analysis, the relevant grounds of distinction to the analysis of the alleged violation of the right are the grounds of unequal belonging. Grounds of unequal belonging are whatever criteria of distinction render in the certain case the distinction suspicious to violate the right to equal belonging. I have also distinguished the complaints when the Petitioner alleges membership in a group among the Designated Beneficiaries and when she/he does not claim such a membership (inter and intra group complaints of unequal belonging). It is upon the above theretical analysis I have suggested certain criteria of judicial review. There are three criteria to be answered in affirmative for the prima facie violation of the Right to Democratic Belonging to be established. In particular, the criterion for standing is whether there is a distinction based on arguable grounds of unequal belonging. If the judge answers in affirmative, then, the next criterion is whether there is a distinction based on grounds of unequal belonging. If yes, the next criterion is whether this distinction violates the right to equal belonging, which is the broad scope of the ultimate right. If there is a violation of the right to equal belonging, there is a prima facie violation of the Right to Democratic Belonging. The third part of the thesis deals with the question of whether the violation of the right to equal belonging is justified in a democratic society in the certain case. The democratic society has been defined as a participatory community of equals. I have suggesed an analytical zone over the the redefinition of the right in a democratic society in the certain case. The [Sub]zone of the Democratic Redefiniton of the Right is different from the very particular and exceptional analytical zone of the law of necessity in a democratic society. I have identified the Subzone of the Law of Necessity in a Democratic Society, but I did not develop it theoretically. However, I have noted some preliminary reflections. In the zone of the redefiniton of the right the judge concludes violation of the ultimate right, if there is a violation of either the minimum content of the right or, a further proportionality test, which takes place above the threshold of protection set by the minimum content of the right. Instead, in the zone of the law of necessity, the judge enters the zone only upon the conclusion that there is a violation of the right. The State may call the judge to answer whether the violation of the right is constitutional under the exceptional circumstances. There are therefore two potential analytical zones of judicial review over whether the limits of the rights are justified in a democratic society. The second zone is exceptional and particular. In the last part, I applied the Judicial Review Theory of the Right to Democratic Belonging on Fisher v. the University of Texas Austin 2013( Fisher I) of the Supreme Court of the United States. In this case, the race conscious affirmative action program for the admissions to the University was challenged by a Caucasian applicant alleging racial discrimination. I concluded that the second criterion of the suggested theory was not met. In particular, there was no any distinction based on grounds of unequal belonging. Therefore, I concluded that there was no any racial discrimination.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2016

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Drymiotou, Elena
  • Δρυμιώτου, Έλενα

Subjects

dc:subject × 13

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/39301

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Drymiotou, Elena; Δρυμιώτου, Έλενα. The right to democratic belonging: a judicial review theory with a special reference to affirmative action programs in higher education: a constitutional approach. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/39301