National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Essays on fiscal and monetary policy interactions in a monetary union
Abstract
dc:descriptionMy Ph.D. thesis investigates the macroeconomic policy mix in a monetary union from a strategic perspective, with a clear reference to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. It rests on the ‘new’ theory of economic policy research agenda that analyses economic policy with the use of game theory. The purpose of my thesis is to examine the macroeconomic stabilisation and welfare implications of fiscal-monetary policy interactions in a monetary union at both country-specific and union levels, while the motivation was the imperfect institutional structure of the policy-making in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. The focus is on short-run stabilisation policies to various shocks under alternative assumptions on the sequence of moves, coordination schemes, structural characteristics and heterogeneities, and authorities’ preferences. In Chapter 1 I analyse the theoretical issues on the subject matter and present some empirical evidence, while in Chapter 2 I provide a survey of the related literature. Chapter 3 presents the benchmark model for the analysis of strategic policy interactions in monetary unions, which is a static reduced-form (New) Keynesian two-country monetary-union model. The model provides a unified framework between early supply-side models with more recent demand-side ones, by allowing the two policy instruments to directly affect inflation. I examine the macroeconomic policy mix when the authorities have different albeit non-conflicting objectives under alternative strategic and fiscal regimes. The main findings are that when the two policy instruments are not perfect substitutes in the stabilisation process (i) the leader authority reacts to the follower’s reaction parameter, while the authorities may even react pro-cyclically, and (ii) both the strategic and the fiscal regimes do matter at the union level. Thus, questions like which strategic and fiscal regime is preferable from the viewpoint of the monetary authority (or the social planner) become relevant.Chapter 4 examines the impact of central bank’s preferences towards union-wide fiscal stance stabilisation on the policy mix under monetary leadership. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 relax the main assumption in the literature that national fiscal authorities move simultaneously by considering sequential fiscal asymmetries that create a fiscal strategic advantage. Chapter 5 assumes that those asymmetries are due to structural heterogeneities on the use of automatic fiscal stabilisers between the two member-states in the monetary union, capturing differences in welfare states. I examine the welfare implications of the fiscal strategic advantage and its impact on the union-wide fiscal stance and interest rates under alternative strategic regimes. Chapter 6 considers a core-periphery monetary union, where the fiscal authority of the periphery’s member-state is always the follower towards both the monetary authority and the core member-state’s fiscal authority. I examine the welfare implications of a possible cooperation between the leading authorities, as well as of a fiscal lead. I succeed in providing a ranking for the alternative strategic regimes. Chapter 7 examines the macroeconomic policy mix under fiscal leadership when fiscal policy can directly affect inflation. I find that pure asymmetric demand shocks cannot be fully stabilised at the union level and fiscal policies may even diverge under identical countries with no interconnections. Last but not least, Chapter 8 assumes a debt accumulation equation and examines the impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on debt stabilisation at the union level, and the implications for financial stability. I examine the overall policy coordination regime, central bank’s preferences towards either union-wide debt stabilisation or interest-rate smoothing, the symbiosis regime under debt-concerned authorities, and, finally, the impact of an interest-rate premium on the policy mix. The optimal weight of a debt-concerned monetary authority under various scenarios is also computed.Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2017
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Mavrodimitrakis, Christos
- Μαυροδημητράκης, Χρήστος
Subjects
dc:subject × 13Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/42328