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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Σημεία ισορροπίας και αλληλεπιδράσεις μεταξύ των παιχτών σε παιχνίδια χωρίς συνεργασία

Abstract

dc:description

The first area concerns the comparison of the equilibrium points -- strategies and payoffs - of a bimatrix game versus the equilibrium points of the same game (same action spaces and payoff functions) when it is played sequentially. Specifically, given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after being informed of the irrevocable commitment of the leader (but not of its realization in case it is mixed). Based on a result by von Stengel and Zamir (2010), the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal strategies for each player are discussed as a possible solution concept. It is shown that in non-degenerate bimatrix games (a) pure commitment optimal strategies together with the follower's best response constitute Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and (b) strategies that participate in a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of the underlying game are strictly worse than commitment optimal strategies, provided they are not matrix game optimal. For various classes of bimatrix games that generalize zero sum games, the relationship between the maximin value of the leader's payoff matrix, the Nash equilibrium payoff and the commitment optimal value is discussed. For the Traveler's Dilemma, the commitment optimal strategy and commitment value for the leader are evaluated and seem more acceptable as a solution than the unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, the relationship between commitment optimal strategies and Nash equilibria in 2x2 bimatrix games is thoroughly examined and in addition, necessary and sufficient conditions for the follower to be worse off at the equilibrium of the leadership game than at any Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game are provided. The results of our research are presented in the paper On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games, which has been accepted for publication in the International Game Theory Review journal. Additionally, this paper has been presented at the 9th International Conference of the Israeli Chapter of the Game Theory Society and the Stony Brook International Conference in Game Theory, at an invited talk at South Dakota State University and at the Seminar of the Division of Statistics & Operations Research, Department of Mathematics, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens.The second research field concerns the classic Cournot model of oligopoly, at which we question the assumption of a fixed and exogenously given cost for the competing firms. This line of research has produced two papers. In the first, we study a single product market with affine inverse demand function in which two producers/retailers, producing under capacity constraints, may order additional quantities from a single profit maximizing supplier. We express this chain as a two stage game and show that it has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which we calculate explicitly. If the supplier faces uncertainty about the demand intercept and whenever a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists, the supplier's profit margin at equilibrium is a fixed point of a translation of the MRL function of his belief under the assumption that his belief is non-atomic and the retailers are identical. If the supplier's belief is of Decreasing Mean Residual Lifetime (DMRL), the game has a unique subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Various properties of the equilibrium solution are established, inefficiencies at equilibrium generated by the lack of information of the supplier are investigated, and examples are provided for various interesting cases. Finally, the main results are generalized for more than two identical producers/retailers. Our contribution lies in the extension of the classic Cournot model to a model that incorporates the formation of the cost parameter and aims to initiate the reexamination of the results that originate from the, usually non-realistic in contemporary economics, assumption of fixed marginal costs. In the second paper, we study a classic Cournot market, which we extend to a two-stage game with endogenous cost formation: the retailers' marginal cost represents purchases from a price-setting, revenue-maximizing supplier. Any demand uncertainty falls to the supplier, who acts first and sets the wholesale price under incomplete information concerning the retailers' willingness-to-pay at this price for ordering the product. We introduce the generalized mean residual life (GMRL) function of the supplier's belief distribution $F$ and show that his revenue function is unimodal, if the GMRL function is decreasing -- (DGMRL) property -- and $F$ has finite second moment. In this case, we characterize the supplier's optimal price as a fixed point of his MRL function and provide a bound on the market-inefficiency due to demand uncertainty, which is tight over the class of DMRL distributions. We then turn to the class of DGMRL random variables and study their moments, limiting behavior, and closure properties. Under the additional assumption that $F$ has a density, we establish its relationship to the widely used class of increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) random variables. If a random variable is IGFR, then it is DGMRL. We provide a sufficient condition for the converse to be true and show that the limiting behavior of the GMRL and GFR functions is closely linked under a reciprocal relationship. Our results are presented in two papers entitled: Endogenizing the cost parameter in Cournot oligopoly and Selling to Cournot oligopolists: pricing under uncertainty & generalized mean residual life. The first has been presented in several international conferences with peer revision, which include the 10th International Conference on Game Theory and Management, 12th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING 12) and the central conference of the Game Theory research field, GAMES 2016, 5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society.My doctoral studies have been financed by a scholarschip of the Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation, which I gratefully acknowledge. The papers Endogenizing the cost parameter in Cournot oligopoly and On the commitment value and commitment optimal strategies in bimatrix games have been part of the research program Excellence II, European Social Fund for Research: "Optimization of stochastic systems under partial information. The presentations at SING 12 and Stony Brook were financed by the Special Account for Research Grants of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Leonardos, Stefanos
  • Λεονάρδος, Στέφανος

Subjects

dc:subject × 8

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/42554

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Leonardos, Stefanos; Λεονάρδος, Στέφανος. Σημεία ισορροπίας και αλληλεπιδράσεις μεταξύ των παιχτών σε παιχνίδια χωρίς συνεργασία. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/42554