National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Corporate governance and corporate finance policies
Abstract
dc:descriptionMost existing asymmetric information papers on corporate finance assume that the securities issued have a continuous payoff function. In this thesis we show that this is an unjustifiable and restrictive assumption as there are asymmetric information problems in which the implementation of the efficient allocation requires the issue of securities with a discontinuous payoff function.Specifically, in the second chapter of the thesis we study government interventions in a financial sector that is overwhelmed by the debt overhang problem and as a result, many positive NPV projects are not undertaken. We try to eliminate the credit risk or decrease the probability of bank’s default in order to incentivize the banks to restart the valuable lending for the real economy while we attempt to minimize the subsidy to the banks' debt holders. The bailout agency proposes voluntary recapitalization of banks with equity cash injections and receives as a return a fraction of the total bank's shares and an exotic option (barrier option) that conditions its exercise on the realization of bank assets’ value. In the third chapter, we discuss firm financing in an adverse selection environment. The firms seek external financing to finance their positive net present value projects because they do not have enough cash to finance them alone. Financiers cannot distinguish the types of entrepreneurs and as a result inefficient equilibria arise (i.e. underinvestment, overinvestment). Assuming two possible types and discrete stochastic return for the firm, our equilibrium security is a combination of debt with an encapsulated barrier option that conditions its exercise on the firm's return, which makes possible the perfect screening of the two types of firms and thus we can obtain the first best optimum, where the entrepreneurs invest like their first best at fair terms.Finally, in the fourth chapter, we extend the model of chapter 3 and we seek for optimal ways of financing in an adverse selection environment. However, now we assume that the firm's stochastic return is not discrete, but instead is continuous. Most of the existing literature in corporate finance assumes that firm's stochastic returns are distributed with first order stochastic dominance or may also satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property that is quite strict as a property, and is a prerequisite to many models, for an equilibrium to exist. Assuming mean reducing spreads for the distribution of stochastic returns, the optimal contract is a security that pays everything to the financier in the tails of the distribution while in the middle the financier receives a flat repayment. Nevertheless, the optimal result is not always attainable; under specific parameter values first best result is feasible but for other parameter values only pooling equilibria arise.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2018
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Gkaintes, Aris
- Γκαϊντές, Άρης
Subjects
dc:subject × 24- Διάσωση τραπεζών
- Χρέος
- Κυβερνητική παρέμβαση
- Ανακεφαλαιοποίηση
- Δυσμενής επιλογή
- Βέλτιστη επένδυση
- Δικαιώματα προαίρεσης φραγμού
- Σχεδίαση αξιογράφων
- Αγορές κεφαλαίου
- Ασυνεχής συνάρτηση κερδών
- Bank bailout
- Debt overhang
- Government intervention
- Efficient recapitalization
- Adverse selection
- Security design
- Barrier options
- Capital markets
- Discontinuous payoff function
- Optimal investment
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Οικονομικά και Επιχειρήσεις
- Social Sciences
- Economics and Business
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/42692