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University of Ioannina

Η θεωρία του χρόνου και της μνήμης από τον Αριστοτέλη στον Μπερξόν: διάλογος στη βάση της χρονικής συνέχειας

Abstract

dc:description

Our present study constitutes an investigation of time consciousness and is conducted through twoleading philosophical approaches, the Aristotelian and the Bergsonian. Despite the fact that these two theories are recorded in the history of philosophy as diametrically opposed, they, surprisingly, share a common postulate on time: that of temporal continuity, which serves for us as a motive lever to deploy philosophical reflection. The key problem is being traced in the Aristotelian theory of time, as set out in the book IV of Aristotle’s Physics, and can be located in the definition of time as the number of motion: given that number normally refers to discrete quantities, one can detect at this point an inherent difficulty in the Aristotelian theory, since the philosopher systematically insists on the de facto continuity of time and movement. Similar problem is created on account of the Bergsonian theory, if we ask where the possibility of comparing durations and extracting time out of them does rely. Through the Aristotelian critique of the Eleatic paradoxes of magnitude and movement, and the corresponding reflection of Bergson on these same paradoxes, its own requirement of indivisible continuity of time and movement is highlighted, so that a quasi-dialogue is established between these two thinkers — a condition which we consider as primordial for the enhancement of philosophical thinking. This parallelism not only contributes to a more comprehensive examination of the temporal consciousness issue but also promotes the innovative reading of both philosophies. Certainly Bergson considers the Aristotelian theory of place erroneous, because the extension is excluded from this notion, while the theory of time is held as erroneous because it is based on the conceptual discontinuity of number.According to Bergson, movement, i.e. the temporal duration, presents sustainable aspects ofsubstance and cannot be divided without producing a change of nature, i.e. a new difference. In aneffort to remove the interpretative difficulties, firstly we emphasize the foundation of the Aristotelian theory of time on the realm of movement (Physics, IV) and we re-evaluate Aristotle’s attempt to develop an innovative approach of experience, maintaining at the same time the distinction of sensation and intellection. The Aristotelian theory (On the soul, II-III) rehabilitates sensation as the source of knowledge and introduces a complementary theory of imagination, in which falls the analysis of memory (Parva naturalia). Therefore, the field of temporal consciousness, according to Aristotle, is not distinct from the field of physics, and for this reason continuity and sensation are fundamental features of time consciousness, which finally comes to be inscribed, through a dynamic and mathematically symmetrical way, in the phenomenon of movement. A final conclusion will be that the dynamic and empirical character of temporal consciousness is a perspective towards which converge both philosophers with the exception of a crucial difference: while Aristotle would admit that the element of the potential stems from pre-existing forms, indicating as its ultimate source the divine intellect, Bergson, on his side, considers that time horizon is mainly constituted by the endless actualisation of differentiating elements, forming a wave of becoming which is an expression of creative evolution. Anyway, Bergson also concludes to affirm the necessity of a universal conscience. Thus we can partially understand, through this reasoning, Heidegger’s suggestion to classify the Bergsonian approach within the Aristotelian tradition, in the sense that Bergson’s thinking still moves within the empirical subject-object structure, in order to investigate time. On the other hand, the Aristotelianapproach should be seen outside the context of traditional empiricism, as a conception of temporality through terms of dynamic isomorphism.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Ioannina
Year dc:date
2016

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Tabakis, Kharalambos
  • Ταμπάκης, Χαράλαμπος

Subjects

dc:subject × 18

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/43411

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Tabakis, Kharalambos; Ταμπάκης, Χαράλαμπος. Η θεωρία του χρόνου και της μνήμης από τον Αριστοτέλη στον Μπερξόν: διάλογος στη βάση της χρονικής συνέχειας. University of Ioannina, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/43411