Abstract
dc:descriptionThe present thesis consists of three independent essays that study vertical relations and vertical integration. Vertical relations are ubiquitous in real-world markets, as the vast majority of goods are produced in several stages of the so-called vertical production chain, from raw materials, to intermediate goods, to final products. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the classic anti-trust issues of price discrimination (Chapter 1) and horizontal mergers (Chapter 2) within the context of vertically related markets, and investigate the behavior of vertically integrated firms with respect to their contractual interaction with other vertically separated firms (Chapter 3). The aforementioned issues are studied within an Industrial Organization framework using game theoretic tools.In the first essay (Chapter 1), we study the welfare effects of input price discrimination when an upstream supplier that secretly contracts with two cost-asymmetric downstream firms undertakes R&D investments. We show that a ban on input price discrimination may increase or decrease R&D investments depending on the degree of downstream cost-asymmetry. Nevertheless, we find that welfare always decreases after the ban. Consequently, contrary to the common presumption, banning discrimination reduces welfare even when its effect on R&D levels is positive. In the second essay (Chapter 2), we study upstream horizontal mergers when one of the merging parties is vertically integrated. Under upstream cost symmetry and observable contracting, we demonstrate that such type of mergers always harm consumers. Under observable contracting but upstream asymmetric costs, we show that overall consumer surplus may increase post-merger even though input prices increase and some consumers are worse off. Under upstream cost symmetry but unobservable contracting, we find that consumers may be better off post-merger even in the absence of exogenous efficiency gains. In the third essay (Chapter 3), we consider a vertically integrated firm that sells input to, and competes against a downstream rival. We demonstrate that, when the integrated firm chooses its input quantity, it accommodates downstream rival’s sales despite downstream competition being of the Cournot type. Upstream price-setting leaves no room for accommodating behavior implying that for a vertically integrated input monopolist setting input price or input quantity makes crucial difference.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας
- Year dc:date
- 2018
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Pinopoulos, Ioannis
- Πινόπουλος, Ιωάννης
Subjects
dc:subject × 14Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/43488