University of Crete (UOC)
Essays in corporate governance and labor relations: a game-theoretic approach
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis Dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, we deal with the strategic profit–sharing. We study firms’ incentives to offer profit-sharing schemes in a unionized differentiated goods duopoly in which firms bargain with a sector-wide union or firm-specific unions over the selected remuneration schemes. We show that unions always prefer to form a sector-wide union and conduct coordinated bargaining. Under Cournot competition, ex-ante symmetric firms may choose to offer different remuneration schemes under coordinated bargaining and become ex-post asymmetric. Universal profit-sharing schemes arise as long as the union’s bargaining power is low enough. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, firms never offer profit-sharing schemes and universal fixed wage schemes is the unique equilibrium. Welfare analysis indicates that policymakers should institutionalize decentralized bargaining and encourage profit-sharing schemes.In Chapter 2, we consider the strategic implications of the disclosure regime for vertical contract terms. The latter is used in the literature either as observable or as secret. We endogenize this decision and show that the mode and intensity of the downstream competition, as well as the upstream market structure, play a significant role in the observability of the vertical contract terms. When a common supplier bargains with each retailer over a two-part tariff contract, interim observability intensifies the commitment problem, by offering a wholesale price below the marginal cost. The same holds under linear contracts or Bertrand competition. Under dedicated suppliers, it is more profitable to bargain over interim unobservable contracts and through them to alleviate the commitment problem. Policymakers could increase the social welfare by encouraging interim observability (unobservability) when firms compete in quantities (prices). Monopolized upstream markets are more prone to have aligned incentives with the policymakers, especially if the downstream retailers compete over quantities.In Chapter 3, we study the incentives for horizontal upstream mergers in a vertically related industry, under bargain and endogenous contract types. We show that the contract types used could have important consequences for the equilibrium market structure and vice versa. If it is the retailers who choose contract types, they share the same preferences as the policymakers and choose to offer two-part tariff contracts, leading the suppliers not to merge. This result has some policy implications. If it is the suppliers who decide contract types, they prefer to merge and offer a partial forward vertical ownership scheme. Under Bertrand competition, there is always an upstream merger, but the common manufacturer will offer a two-part tariff contract for intermediate bargain power levels. For high bargain power levels, he will choose a partial forward vertical ownership scheme, while for low bargain power will suffer from negative profits. A policymaker, considering the maximization of the social welfare should consider the upstream merger and two-part tariff contracts.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Crete (UOC)
- Year dc:date
- 2018
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Skartados, Panagiotis
- Σκαρτάδος, Παναγιώτης
Subjects
dc:subject × 16Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- BY
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/43928