Abstract
dc:descriptionThe government bond spread, which reflects the associated risk of default, has become a leadingeconomic variable after the recent financial crisis. Using a two-regime model, a high-spread and a lowspread regime, and two panel data sets, I investigate the influence on the spread of macroeconomic and quality-of-institutions variables, namely, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the rate of inflation, the rate of growth of real GDP, the primary surplus, the rate of unemployment, public investment, a risk-free interest rate (to capture shocks in the global economy), control of corruption, and government effectiveness. I define the two regimes by including a threshold value in the spread function, in accordance with the perceived fair value of the spread as a reference point. I assume that the decision maker may exhibit not only risk-averse, but also risk-seeking behavior, and I have introduced his/her preferences in the context of winning or losing. I have defined the threshold on the basis of credit ratings, namely, as the average of the associated rating class. Using annual data from a panel of 11 Eurozone countries and from another of 32 OECD countries, Ι estimate a log-linear equation for the spread with both fixed country-specific and time effects, as well as a nonlinear equation with partial adjustment with fixed country-specific effects only. Our empirical findings suggest that the effects of the explanatory variables on the spread are regime-dependent, since the regression coefficients differ in the two regimes. The estimated coefficients of the inflation rate, the real GDP growth rate and the unemployment rate are statistically significant in both regimes and robust to the various approaches used. Contrary to what has been found in the literature, however, the primary surplus is significant only in the low-spread regime, implying that it matters only when the spreads are lower than or equal to thereference point, whereas the debt-to-GDP ratio is not significant. Taken on its face value, this finding has an interesting implication for the policies applied to the case of the Greek crisis, where the primary surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio played a pivotal role, despite the fact that the spread was above the fair value. Thus, the “rescue program” for Greece needs to be reconsidered. The finding that the sizes of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are larger in the high-spread than in the low-spread regime is consistent with our assumption that a risk-seeking decision maker has inelastic demand for loans and ends up paying a higher spread than a risk-averse decision maker. For if a policy maker borrows when the spreads are above the “fair” value, knowing that this additional demand for funds will increase the spread by a lot, he/she behaves as a risk-seeking person.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Ioannina
- Year dc:date
- 2017
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Sarigiannidis, Georgios
- Σαρηγιαννίδης, Γεώργιος
Subjects
dc:subject × 24- Μακροοικονομία
- Διαχείριση κινδύνου
- Σημείο αναφοράς
- Υπόδειγμα δυο καταστάσεων
- Περιθώριο απόδοσης κινδύνου
- Απόδοση κρατικών ομολόγων
- “Δίκαιη” τιμή περιθωρίου απόδοσης κινδύνου
- Προσδιοριστικοί παράγοντες περιθωρίου απόδοσης κινδύνου
- Επιζήτηση κινδύνο
- Macroeconomics
- Risk assessment
- Threshold
- Two regime model
- Spread
- Government bonds yields
- “Fair” spread
- Spread determinants
- Risk seeking
- Elasticity demand for loans
- Asymmetric effects
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Οικονομικά και Επιχειρήσεις
- Social Sciences
- Economics and Business
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/44431