Back to search

Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας

Essays on economics of collusion: cartels, leniency and advertising - selling platforms

Abstract

dc:description

This thesis contains four papers. The first three are dealing with the design and effects of Leniency Programs (LPs), while the fourth discusses cartel enforcement in two-sided platforms, focusing on the specific but important case of media markets. In the first paper the demand is stochastic and firms are unable to perfectly observe their rival’s choices. It is shown that a LP restricted to only firms that report a cartel not yet under investigation may undermine cartel stability, but does not affect the duration of price wars. Post-investigation leniency may have ambiguous effects on both, cartel stability and the duration of competitive periods. The second paper relaxes an important and widely used assumption in the leniency-related literature, namely that every single firm possesses perfect evidence. Assuming that the conviction-probability is increasing in the number of reporting firms, we show first that efficient cartel deterrence requires incentives for all firms to report. Under a regime that secures a marker for the first in line applicant, eligibility for leniency should be extended to at least a second informant. We show that the introduction of the marker system has an ambiguous impact on cartel deterrence. In relation to the manner that the marker is secured and the cartel-related evidence is allocated, we derive the conditions under which allowing the first applicant to secure a marker enhances cartel deterrence. The third paper investigates the impact of leniency programs on cartelists’ decision to allocate the incriminating evidence. Firms are allowed to possess either exclusive or common pieces of cartel-related evidence. The cartel organization is able to allocate the incriminating evidence in an attempt to enhance the sustainability of the illicit agreement. It is shown that unless the conviction of an investigated cartel is unlikely, when the AA optimally anticipates the cartel’s ability to allocate the evidence, only partial information is obtained.The forth paper underlines the impact of indirect network externalities on the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement to deter collusion between advertising-selling platforms. Since two-sided collusion is less likely to be sustained as consumers (e.g. readers/viewers) become more ad-avoiders while the opposite is true for one-sided collusion, firms may be induced to semi-collude (collude only on advertising) instead of colluding on both sides. When firms semi-collude and consumers are ad-neutral, the imposition of fines based on the illegal gain of the colluding side enhances cartel deterrence compared to fines based on the total illegal profits.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας
Year dc:date
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Charistos, Konstantinos
  • Χαριστός, Κωνσταντίνος

Subjects

dc:subject × 10

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/44787

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Charistos, Konstantinos; Χαριστός, Κωνσταντίνος. Essays on economics of collusion: cartels, leniency and advertising - selling platforms. Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44787