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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Οι έννοιες του πολιτικού "θεμελίου" και του πολιτικού "υποκειμένου" στον Martin Heidegger

Abstract

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The present doctorate aims to explore the close relationship between the traditional concept of the metaphysical and political ground of the presence of beings on the one hand and the modern concept of the Cartesian subject and its subsequent political versions and transformations on the other hand. First of all, it seeks to disclose the intrinsic ambiguity hidden in Heidegger’s arguments as regards, on the one hand, the relationship between simple perceptual intuition (simple perception) and categorial intuition and, on the other hand, the relationship between Being and beings within ontological difference. Heidegger gradually transforms the Husserlian concept of categorial intuition and finally abandons it. All the same, the stage of temporary use of categorial intuition is absolutely necessary for Heidegger in order to subsequently develop the concepts of transcendence toward world, of understanding of Being and of disclosedness of Being. Heidegger inconspicuously determines in a slightly different way from Husserl the relationship between simple perception and categorial intuition. For Husserl the founded acts of categorial intuition are based on the founding acts of simple perception and imagination. Although Heidegger adopts this view at the same time maintains that the acts of simple perception presuppose or are already permeated by categorial intuition. In this manner Heidegger’s analysis faces the danger of circular reasoning. The relationship between categorial intuition and simple perceptual intuition corresponds to the relationship between understanding of Being and intentional comportment towards beings. Thus, the relationship between perceptual and categorial acts in which this meaning is constituted corresponds to the relationship between the correlated objects of the aforementioned acts, namely corresponds to the relation between beings and Being or, in other words, is related to ontological difference. The difference and at the same time the unity within difference between Being and beings is understood by Heidegger on the basis of the distinction between disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of Being and uncoveredness or Being-uncovered (Entdecktheit or Entdeckt-sein) of beings. The disclosedness of Being is the fundamental phenomenon on which the uncoveredness of beings (namely the ontological possibility of the uncovering of beings in a specific each time manner of appearance) firstly and consequently the uncovering (Entdecken) of a specific being are based. According to the prevalent understanding of ontological difference, which Heidegger himself supports, disclosedness of Being is the utmost foundation of Dasein’s uncovering comportment towards beings.All the same, if we apply Derrida’s deconstructive method, we can claim that in Heidegger’s text a secondary alternative understanding of ontological difference inconspicuously operates in parallel to the first dominant understanding. According to this secondary and hidden way of understanding-which in most cases is not explicitly expressed in Heidegger’s text-disclosedness of Being, uncoveredness of beings and the empirical uncovering of a specific being are equally primordial and interdependent. We claim that both of these ways of understanding coexist in Heidegger’s text and that a supposed synthesis of them is impossible. According to the aforementioned alternative way of understanding of ontological difference Being is determined by beings to the same extend that beings are determined by Being. Moreover, we claim that, later, Heidegger realizes the possibility of this bidirectional determination hidden in his own text. Late Heidegger considers this possibility to be a danger and consequently proposes the abandonment of ontological difference in favor of an unmediated understanding of Being (Sein) which henceforth he calls: Be-ng (Seyn).On the other hand, the concept of political difference concerns the distinction between politics and the political. The political refers to the ontological making possible of the different domains of society, including the domain of politics in the narrow sense. Political difference was introduced as a reaction to the theoretical controversy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. According to Marchart post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the possibility of grounding. It denies only the possibility of an ultimate transcendent foundation insofar as this ontological impossibility makes possible the historical and contingent grounds in plural. The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference also undermines the possibility of an ultimate ontical ground which establishes the presence of all the other beings. If one wants to think beyond the concept of ground, one should obtain a clear understanding of Being as Being, namely one should grasp the Being in its difference from beings. All the same, Heidegger tends to replace the ontical grounds of metaphysics with Being itself as a new kind of ultimate ontological foundation. Never the less, as we observed before, one can detect in many points of Heideggerian argumentation traces of a second alternative understanding of ontological difference which does not belong in Heidegger’s intentions and which undermines the primordiality of Being. This alternative understanding establishes a reciprocity between Being and beings. In our view and against Marchart’s view, political difference not only is based in this second way of understanding but, at the same time, develops more decisively than the notion of ontological difference the mutual interdependence between Being and beings. On the other hand, the Cartesian ego as the subiectum of modern era is not an ordinary ontical foundation of the presence of the totality of beings like the traditional ancient or medieval foundations (namely, like the Platonic agathon, the Aristotelian primal unmoved mover or the Christian God), because its character is relative and self-contradictory. The Cartesian ego as the fundamental subject of thought is not able to constitute and establish itself as a fixed and absolutely certain foundation. In our opinion, Descartes inaugurates an era in Western philosophy in which a gradual de-substantializing and dislocating of the modern subiectum of thought takes place. Heidegger brings this tendency to its completion by maintaining that Dasein’s substance is its existence. All the same, Heidegger’s thought does not transcend subjectivity. On the contrary, it reveals and at the same time it represents its inner and hidden core. The central feature of modern philosophy of subjectivity is that all modern thinkers consider that the most fundamental question of thought is the nature and the possibility of the theoretical and practical relationship between man and beings. Primarily they try to uncover the way man understands the presence of beings, namely the way of their possible givenness, and then they search for all the other scientific, theological or ethical issues. Firstly, they examine the way beings come to the fore, the way beings become possible as phenomena, and then they search for the ontical causes or the grounds of the physical procedures. On the contrary, ancient or medieval thought used to search primarily for the ontical grounds of beings (and of the relationship between man and beings). In pre-modern thought the absolute ontical grounds had a priority and they used to establish the presence of beings or, in other words, the possibility and the ways of the coming to presence of beings. The actual (energeia) being in Aristotle had a priority over the possible (dynamei) being. Actuality as energeia used to ground possibility (dynamis) and not the vice versa. In political terms this means that the absolute ontical and political ground had a priority and produced the power which arranged and governed the presence of beings in the city. In our opinion, the theoretical and practical relationship between man and beings is this ontological and, at the same time, political power. In pre-modern thought the ontical foundation produces, constructs, the ontological and political power, namely the theoretical, practical and political relationship between man and beings. This is the origin of productive metaphysics. In modern thought gradually arises a tendency which grants priority to power itself, to the theoretical and practical relationship between beings and man itself, or, in other words, to the being of beings itself. This is the heart of modern subjectivity. Heidegger tries to uncover this inner core of modernity. In modernity the ontological and political dynamei, namely power, has priority over energeia, namely over any absolute ontical ground. This modern ontological dynamei differs from Aristotelian dynamis, because it is not subject to any energeia fundamental being. So, the essence of this modern version of possibility never appears. It never becomes an energeia being. In the modern era clear and radical possibility, namely ontological and political power, has a priority over actuality, that is over the aforementioned relative and provisional ontical grounds. This is the inner truth of the aforementioned notion of political difference. On the one hand power as radical possibility has a priority over energeia beings but, on the other hand, it depends on them in a relative way in order to obtain a provisional shape. In modernity power has a priority over any kind of ontical foundation. This means that any absolute ontical foundation is impossible. Never the less, this impossibility renders possible the many, provisional and relative ontical grounds. The notion of Ereignis in Heidegger tends to uncover this hidden condition of modern thought. All the same, Heidegger formed the concept of Ereignis in order to transcend the notion of ontological difference. Ereignis refers to the incessantly withdrawing in concealment unity and origin of the no more appropriate-in late Heidegger’s view-notion of ontological difference. Never the less, ontological difference, in the light of the aforementioned second alternative understanding, on the one hand and political difference on the other hand, in our opinion, are more appropriate notions in order to describe this interdependence between the many provisional ontical grounds and power as clear and radical dynamis, between the one who grounds and the one who is grounded. On the contrary, Ereignis tends to become understood as a new super-substantial absolute ground of the totality of beings. Only Derrida’s concept of Différance, which Vincent Descombes configures under the name of original delay, is able to describe the modern tendency of ontological and political power to overcome any type of absolute grounding without becoming power itself a new absolute foundation. This impossibility of a stable grounding haunts all modern political subjects. It establishes and at the same time it undermines the three main forms of modern political subject: individual citizen, nation and Volk (people). We maintain that the aforementioned impossibility guarantees, under certain conditions, the positive possibility of the formation of a modern free political sphere and establishes democracy. In conclusion we support the view that in late modernity we can detect two distinct tendencies as regards the understanding of power as radical possibility. On the one hand there is a hermeneutical tendency to construe power as a self-referential and self-constructional autonomous procedure. In this case the traditional distinction between ontical ground and power collapses but the two parts of the distinction does not disappear. They are integrated in this self-fabricating power. In this way power becomes a new ontico-ontological absolute ground which grounds and constructs itself. Heidegger calls this version of self-fabricating power which subjugates both man and beings as Gestell (enframing). On the other hand, there is a hermeneutical tendency which understands power according to the liberating and intersubjective pattern of Aristotelian and Arendtian praxis, namely in the light of the free political action inside the public space of appearance. The two aformentioned hermeneutical tendencies are extremely competitive. The one tends to integrate the other. A sober philosophical view of modern era has to examine profoundly both of these tendencies.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Efthimiou, Christoforos
  • Ευθυμίου, Χριστόφορος

Subjects

dc:subject × 39

Rights

Language dc:language
gre

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/45223

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
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OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Efthimiou, Christoforos; Ευθυμίου, Χριστόφορος. Οι έννοιες του πολιτικού "θεμελίου" και του πολιτικού "υποκειμένου" στον Martin Heidegger. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/45223