Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences
Ο υλιστικός ιδεαλισμός του Σπινόζα: η υπόσταση και τα κατηγορήματά της στη σπινοζική φιλοσοφία
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe question under study relates to the status of the attributes of the Substance. Are these real properties of Being („extra intellectum“ interpretation) or do they constitute ways of being perceived by an intellect („in intellectum“ interpretation)? This interpretive dichotomy between being and being perceived shaped the reception of Spinozism in the history of philosophy. The general position of the thesis is that Spinoza abolishes the dilemma between idealism and materialism: To the dipoles that have been put forth, and their related function of exclusion (being versus being perceived, unity of Substance versus ontological diversity), Spinoza responds by arguing that he can have it all, the one as well as the many. The argumentation begins by pointing out the common empiricist background of the two prima facie conflicting interpretations of the attributes, and primarily by showing this background to be completely foreign to Spinozism. Then the idealistic core of Spinozism is presented: the perception of the world is always imbued with concepts. This is also the first aspect of the Spinozan concept of immanence, that it is absolutely impossible to leave the space of Thought: The existence of every distinct thing is but the recognition of its distinct nature, that is, its perception as a particular mode of a particular attribute. This is what in the thesis is called the "ontologically constitutive role of the intellect", as the intellect is that which understands the distinct nature of things. The fact that there is no ontological space prior to the conceptual conception of Being means that the constitutive role of the intellect has always already been fulfilled and that, therefore, the possibility of conceptualization is embedded in the very structure of existence. The world is being perceived, in itself. This inherent ability of the Substance to be perceived is the foundation of Spinozan rationality. Following that, the materialistic basis of the Spinozan philosophy is showcased, which consists in the embodied worldliness of philosophical discourse. The discourse of the Real is constitutively immanent in Being - this is the second aspect of immanence - because the materials that structure the meaning of the Substance are formed as a result of embodied interactions within the field of coexistence. Sociality plays here a dual role: On one hand, through the embodied coexistence and interaction between the forms of existence, man constructs the so-called „common concepts“, which are the first stage of rational thought. On the other hand, Substance itself emerges as the field of coexistence in which the power for existence and interaction is thoroughly expressed. Sociality is thus at the core of Spinozan Being. This observation is the third and final aspect of the concept of immanence. Methodologically, the questions that structure this thesis are: The question a. on the truth status of attributes , b. on the status of the attribute of Thought, and c. on the concept of the essence of the Substance. We then attempt to provide answers through the synergy of different interpretative schools of Spinozism, with the main reference thinkers being Michael Della Rocca, Gilles Deleuze, Martin Saar and Vittorio Morfino.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences
- Year dc:date
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Kousiantza, Sofia
- Κουσιάντζα, Σοφία
Subjects
dc:subject × 14Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- BY_NC
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/46262