Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Η επανένταξη της Ελλάδος στο στρατιωτικό σκέλος του Οργανισμού Βορειοατλαντικού Συμφώνου
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe main subject of this dissertation is the overview of the negotiation process that took place between Greece and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the reintegration of Greece to the integrated military structure of the Alliance. Greece withdrew from the military wing of NATO in August 1974, after a decision of the government of national unity that had just been formed under Konstantinos Karamanlis, as a form of protest towards the inertia and the unethical attitude of the organization during the preceding Cyprus crisis. Apart from a form of protest, the initiative of the new government had other aims, domestic and international, with the former considered probably more important than the later in the minds of the country’s rulers. However, it soon became obvious that the withdrawal had not only failed to deliver the expected advantages, but had exposed the Greek interests to serious danger, since Turkey moved actively with the aim to cover the gap that had been created to the Alliance’s military posture by the absence of Greece. At the same time, an anti-American and ‘anti-atlantic’ movement was rapidly expanding its influence in Greece and the assumption of the government by it could potentially dispute all the ties between Greece and the Western world. Consequently, the Greek policy makers changed course and reoriented their position from the formulation of a special relationship with NATO, which was their aim almost until the end of 1977, to the full reintegration of the country.However, the negotiations met several obstacles because of Turkey’s stance. Predictably, Turkey did not intend to relinquish the advantage it enjoyed as a result of the ‘lame’ Greek participation at the Alliance structures without guarantees for a more favorable redrawing of the two countries’ areas of responsibility at the sensitive area of the Aegean Sea. This reaction triggered a ‘tug-of-war’ of negotiations, with mainly the USA and secondarily NATO at their center. The negotiating procedure ended on October 1980, with Greece’s return at full participation status. However, the thorny issues that had hindered the reintegration had not been dealt with in their substance. The result of this ‘flawed’ reintegration was the perpetuation of the command and control issues at the Aegean and the degradation of the Greek position in NATO, whose consequences are echoing up to this date. Pivoting around the Greek participation at the Alliance during the period of August 1974-October 1980, this study examined several issues that preoccupied the Greek foreign policy during that period and were related to the Greek-American and Greek-Turkish relations. In addition, some incidents that substantially affected the relations between Washington and Ankara during the period in question were reviewed. Those ‘digressions’ were deemed as essential, in order for the reader to fully comprehend the framework inside which the Greek-NATO negotiations were taking place, as well as the stakes for the main ‘players’. This approach allowed a thorough review of the way that all involved parties approached the issues in question. The study is concluded with some final conclusions that resulted from the analysis of the Athens-Ankara-Washington ‘triangle’ during the period 1974-1980, with NATO at its epicenter. Amongst them, it is worth mentioning the inference that the Alliance is an inherently inappropriate forum for the resolution of bilateral problems between its member states.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Vasileiadis, Panagiotis
- Βασιλειάδης, Παναγιώτης
Subjects
dc:subject × 5Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/47654