Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Pricing policies in make-to-order systems with delay-averse strategic customers
Abstract
dc:descriptionIn this thesis, we consider mathematical models for pricing, lead-time quotations, and delay compensations in production and service systems with strategic customers who exhibit risk aversion. Methodologically it lies on the interface between Game theory and Queuing theory. The application framework is a make-to-order production system with lead-time quotations and strategic customers with risk aversion to delay. Specifically, we consider a make-to-order system where customers arrive according to a Poisson process, and the production/service times are i.i.d. exponential random variables. This gives rise to an M/M/1 queuing model. Customers place a value on the service they receive and incur a cost per unit of time of delay. In the first part of this dissertation, we consider the case where customers observe the length of the queue before their decision. We examine the provider’s and social optimizer’s maximization problems and we consider two cases regarding the class of lead-time quotation policies, i.e., dynamic and single. We identify the optimal entrance thresholds in each case. It is shown that the detrimental effects of risk aversion can be addressed more efficiently for the provider’s problem compared to the social optimizer’s one. Furthermore, the profit loss when setting a single lead-time quote is generally small compared to the optimal dynamic quotation policy. In the second part, the system is unobservable for customers. We analyze the effect of customer risk aversion and the compensation policy on the equilibrium join/balk strategies and the resulting input rates, and assess the flexibility of the provider in inducing a range of possible input rates under various constraints on the pricing/compensation policy. A key insight obtained from the analysis is that the main benefit of the lead-time and compensation option is to allow the entrance fee to remain high and the provider prefers strategies that lead to this direction.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
- Year dc:date
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Benioudakis, Myron
- Μπενιουδάκης, Μύρων
Subjects
dc:subject × 20- Συστήματα παραγωγής
- Στρατηγικοί πελάτες
- Ουρές αναμονής
- Θεωρία παιγνίων
- Αποστροφή στον κίνδυνο καθυστέρησης
- Έλεγχος ζήτησης
- Production systems
- Strategic customers
- Queuing theory
- Game theory
- Risk aversion
- Load control
- Φυσικές Επιστήμες
- Μαθηματικά
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Οικονομικά και Επιχειρήσεις
- Natural Sciences
- Mathematics
- Social Sciences
- Economics and Business
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- BY
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/48172