Back to search

National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)

Privacy-oriented cryptographic primitives and protocols for electronic voting

Abstract

dc:description

We propose a new cryptographic primitive, Publicly Auditable Conditional Blind Signatures (PACBS), which connects the verification of a digital signature to publicly available data. During signing, a predicate on these data is embedded into the signature, so that the latter is valid if and only if the former is true. Verification is performed by a designated verifier, in a strong manner, with the use of a private verification key. The privacy of the user requesting the signature is protected information-theoretically, because the message to be signed is blinded. Additionally, to avoid attacks from a malicious signer or verifier that disregards the predicate, all their operations are accompanied with evidence in the form of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge that force them to follow the protocol. We define a security model to capture the guarantees of our primitive and provide an instantiation. We utilize PACBS in a remote electronic voting protocol. The conditional nature of PACBS enables us to build credentials that allow our protocol to provide coercion resistance in there-voting with anonymous credentials paradigm of Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson. When coerced, a voter uses a fake credential to accompany the vote, while when the coercer is not watching, she can cast her real vote which is accompanied by the valid credential. Only the latter will be counted. All interactions are indistinguishable to the coercer, who cannot tell if his attack succeeded. The evidence generated by PACBS accompanied with standard evidence used in e-voting schemes allows each voter to individually verify that their votes were correctly cast and tallied. Vote counting is also universally verifiable by any interested party. Our overall architecture also provides strong privacy guarantees, since, contrary to the conventional e-voting paradigm, we do not assume that the talliers are trusted for privacy. This allows us, to extend our reasoning about privacy against a computationally unbounded attacker. We generalize our findings to express security models for everlasting privacy that also consider the data available to the adversary.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)
Year dc:date
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Grontas, Panagiotis
  • Γροντάς, Παναγιώτης

Subjects

dc:subject × 16

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • BY_NC_SA
Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/49186

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Grontas, Panagiotis; Γροντάς, Παναγιώτης. Privacy-oriented cryptographic primitives and protocols for electronic voting. National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/49186