Abstract
dc:descriptionIn a multi-party competition under proportional representation, the government is a coalition of parties that agreed on a policy and distribution of portfolio benefits in a legislative bargaining game with concession costs. The equilibrium bargaining outcome is based on the ideological proximity of the parties and their relative weights in the legislature. The model can generate two party political equilibria when entry costs are prohibitively high while conditions are given for multi-party equilibria. In a three party competition with purely office motivated parties and strategic voters, two large parties adopt the ideal policy of the median voter and a smaller a distinct to the median’s ideal policy. The government is formed by one of the large and the smaller party.In the second chapter it is found that a party’s voting power in the government is statistically significant in explaining the utility it obtains in a coalition government. By using a new data set on formateur parties, the formateur is found to be rather disadvantaged to its critical partners regarding the distribution of benefits.In the third chapter I analyse a model of tripartite wage negotiations where the government participates in by assigning the relative bargaining power to the negotiating partners: the labour union and the employers’ association. The government’s decision to support one of the negotiating partners depends on their lobbying behaviour. Due to conflict of interest of the social partners, the government has to balance the monetary transfers that it receives from the lobby to the loss that it incurs from departing from its ideal policy and its reelection motives. In a two party electoral competition framework, the lobby improves its utility the closer the two candidates’ bliss points are to that of the median voter.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Institutes outside Greece
- Year dc:date
- 2012
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Kolios, Georgios
- Κολιός, Γεώργιος
Subjects
dc:subject × 24- Θεωρία διαπραγματεύσεων
- Διακυβέρνηση, Μοντέλα
- Πολιτική οικονομία
- Θεσμοί πολιτικοί
- Σχηματισμός συνασπισμών
- Λόμπινγκ
- Μοντέλα ψηφοφόρου
- Μικροοικονομία
- Χωρική ανάλυση
- Bargaining theory
- Governance mode
- Political economy
- Institutions politiques
- Coalition formation
- Lobbying
- Voting behaviour
- Microeconomics
- Spatial analysis
- Οικονομικά και Επιχειρήσεις
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Οικονομικά
- Economics and Business
- Social Sciences
- Ecomonics
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/50729