Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Η μετα-αλήθεια ως αυτο-εξαπάτηση: θεωρητικό πλαίσιο, πρακτικές στρατηγικές, ηθικές συνέπειες
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe research aims at the explanation of the notion of post-truth. The dissertation is articulated in Three Main Parts, and is supplemented by a methodological Introduction to the problematization, and a conclusive Epilogue. The course of the argument is as follows: (a) In the Introduction, the explanandum is mapped onto the notion of blame. This move is motivated by the frequent public use of the term post-truth as an accusation. I propose that the inherent force with which blame is thrown at post-truth attitudes must be accounted for by the agency which supports the formation of desired beliefs in the teeth of acknowledged evidence to the contrary. (b) In the First Part, titled “The Normativity of Belief”, I discuss four attempts to ground the alethic norm of belief. I side with a theory motivated by the fitting attitude and the buck-passing accounts of value. This theory establishes that beliefs are normatively formed by epistemic reasons alone, and that the wrong kind of reasons for belief, namely pragmatic reasons, are only the right reasons for the desire of, and the attempt to bring about, beliefs. The exclusivity of epistemic reasons for belief falsifies doxastic voluntarism. However, the will is not prevented from ushering apparent epistemic reasons that best support the belief desired by the doxastic subject. The phenomenon by which a subject is intentionally trying to form an acknowledged false belief in themselves is known as self-deception. (b) In the Second Part, titled “Self-deception”, I spell out two inherent paradoxes of self-deception, the static and the dynamic. My attempt is to argue against the sufficiency of deflationary theories, which attempt to solve the two problems by weeding away two elements of self-deception: intention and knowledge of the truth. If forceful blame against post-truth is to be justified, self-deception must be perpetrated with an elevated degree of agency. (c) The Third Part, titled “Post-truth: The Haggling Interlocutor in the Digital Era”, is an attempt to understand the need to use a new term (post-truth) for an ever-present phenomenon (self-deception). My understanding focuses on the need to account for the role that digital technology plays in triggering, effectuating, deepening, and pulling off self-deception; ultimately, singling out post-truth as a special kind of self-deception. (e) In the Epilogue, I recapitulate the findings of my research, and confirm that they verify my hypothesis: post-truth is the descriptive part of a blame against violations of epistemic and practical normativity, which are committed en masse in order to pull off self-deception about matters of common interest within the unprecedented technological condition of our times.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2022
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Telios, Ioannis
- Τέλιος, Ιωάννης
Subjects
dc:subject × 19- Μετα-αλήθεια
- Αυτο-εξαπάτηση
- Κανονιστικότητα
- Δοξαστική βουλησιαρχία
- Διαλεκτική
- Μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης
- Post-truth
- Self-deception
- Blame
- Normativity
- Doxastic voluntarism
- Dialectics
- Social media
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/52723