National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Το φαινομενικό παράδοξο της πρότασης 6.54 του Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus του Ludwig Wittgenstein: μια ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση του Tractatus με άξονα την έννοια της "ανοησίας"
Abstract
dc:descriptionIn Wittgenstein`s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus we read that most philosophical propositions and questions are 'nonsensical'. In the penultimate remark, 6.54, it is written that the reader who understands the author of the Tractatus will recognize the sentences of the book as 'nonsensical'. However, in the Preface Wittgenstein says that the book communicates true thoughts and that the philosophical problems have, in essentials, been finally solved. The present dissertation is guided by the question how we should understand the concept of 'nonsense' in the Tractatus so that we can throw light on what Wittgenstein`s aim is and on how he really saw philosophy. The main interpretations in the secondary literature of the concept of 'nonsense' and of the paradox of 6.54 are criticized as inadequate and a new solution is proposed. It is shown, on the one hand, that Wittgenstein`s project presupposes that the essence of language is the description of reality. Furthermore, It is implied that only empirical propositions describe reality. These propositions draw their sense from being connected to the phenomenology of possible experiences with which it is possible to establish the truth of these propositions, while the possibility of communication via non-empirical sentences is parasitic upon the sense of empirical propositions. It is argued in the dissertation that in that is based Wittgenstein`s conviction that philosophical claims cannot express something about reality that is not already expressed when we use empirical propositions. On the other hand, it is argued in the dissertation that Wittgenstein, by assigning this status to empirical propositions, does not mean to imply that it is illicit to regard philosophical propositions as expressing philosophical thoughts. By saying that the philosophical propositions are ‘nonsensical’ Wittgenstein does not mean that they don`t express anything. He does not believe that they violate the logic of our language, despite the fact that they arise from misunderstanding that logic. Their ‘defect’, expressed by the attribute ‘nonsensical’, is, on a first level, that they are useless as regards the purpose of describing reality, while, at the same time, they give rise to a wrong impression, namely, that they describe some layer of reality ‘behind’ the empirical reality. At best, they can help us(dis-)solve the philosophical problems by elucidating theoretically the logic of our language, which, however, we already practically apply without a problem, without, that is, the need of philosophy. In their best version, as it is the case with Tractarian propositions, by helping us to distinguish theoretically the essential from the superfluous in the surface form of the language, they ‘show’/symbolize indirectly a parallel distinction between the essential and the superfluous. This distinction is between the possibility to add ethico-aesthetic value/sense to our life (the possibility that life is lived as a complete world) and the possibility that the facts are lived as empty of such value/sense, as fragments of a world empty of value/sense. That is why it is claimed in the Preface that there is value in the fact that the book expresses thoughts.The first reason that the book has value is that the thoughts expressed there, by delimiting the description of valueless facts, at the same time they delimit ‘from the inside’, and ultimately symbolize the ethical/aesthetic sphere.However, even when philosophy succeeds in achieving to symbolize the possibility of a meaningful life, philosophy should remain humble because it falls short of the purpose of attaining this life, since it cannot secure it by giving supposedly true descriptions of (metaphysical) reality. The achievement of a meaningful life remains always at stake, totally independently of the philosophical skillfulness of a person. Regarding that ultimate purpose of living a meaningful life the philosophical propositions in general, but even these of the Tractatus, remain not necessary and, in that sense, they are inessential, superfluous, purposeless. That is expressed by 6.54 when it asks for the propositions of the book to be recognized ‘finally’ as ‘nonsensical’ and that is expressed by the Preface when it gives the second reason for the value of the book: that its value lies in showing how little has been achieved by solving the philosophical problems.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2022
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Markou, Konstantinos
- Μάρκου, Κωνσταντίνος
Subjects
dc:subject × 22- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Πρόταση 6.54
- "Ανοησία"
- Κριτική υπέρβαση της παραδοσιακής μεταφυσικής
- Αντικείμενα του Tractatus
- Νόημα ζωής
- Νόημα πρότασης
- Ηθική του Tractatus/Wittgenstein
- Κριτική της "Νέας/Αποφασιστικής" ερμηνείας
- Proposition 6.54
- 'Nonsense'
- Overcoming of traditional metaphysics
- Ethics in Wittgenstein`s Tractatus
- Tractarian objects
- Critic of 'New/Resolute' interpretation
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/53759