University of Patras
"Upgrading" pleasure: the Aristotelian revision of the platonic model
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe present dissertation deals with the notion of pleasure in Aristotle’s ethical theory. Having realized the difficulties arising from the Platonic definition of pleasure as the perceived replenishment of some sort of lack, the Stagirite develops in the Nicomachean Ethics his own alternative. Aristotle’s decision, however, to treat the same subject twice within a single treatise, and indeed, via two quite incompatible accounts posits a dilemma. Should we understand pleasure as the unimpeded activity of the natural state, as Book VII seems to suggest? Or, should we adopt the perspective of Book X, according to which pleasure is just an additional perfection that supervenes on activity? So far, the common tendency was to take the above discrepancy as indicating authorship by different writers, or as being due to the authorship of the same writer (i.e., Aristotle) who either changed his mind, committed an inconsistency, or simply wrote two treatises that were not supposed to be included in the same work. Through a thorough presentation and analysis of their content, my primary aim here is to show that the accounts in question are not as incompatible as they prima facie seem to be. The only official definition of pleasure is the one found in Book X, whereas Book VII’s formula must simply be taken as an improved version of the opponent’s model, and not as a definition in the strict sense of the term. As regards their superiority, it is pretty clear to me that the account in Book X is the more advanced and sophisticated one; and although there are some discrepancies or even some occasional overlapping, I strongly believe that, contrary to the prevailing view, they were both meant to form part of the Nicomachean Ethics. At the same time, what appears to be equally problematic is a Book VII’s passage (EN VII.12 1153a7-15), which seems to restrict the scope of pleasure only to complete activities, namely to activities that contain their own ends. This automatically implies that all kinds of processes, including those that restore us back to our natural state, should not be regarded as pleasures, but rather as being at best pleasant only “incidentally” (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). But isn’t that strange, given that we often enjoy doing things that have an external end, an end we may or may not attain? And moreover, if this is the case, can we blame Aristotle for the shaping of a model that fails to accommodate such common pleasures as eating and drinking? Does the Aristotelian theory, unable as it is to explain pleasures taken in restorative processes, constitute, after all, a weak response to Plato? The second purpose of my thesis is to offer an alternative interpretation of EN VII.12 that eliminates all these questions. In this respect, I argue that the distinction between “possession” and “use” or between a “state” and its “activation” is crucial for a proper understanding of Aristotle’s reasoning: processes are equally able to yield pleasure due to a particular aspect of theirs which consists in the active use of corresponding states. In conclusion, the main thrust of the present study is not only that it addresses the problems posed by the Nicomachean theory of pleasure, but also that it manages to deal with them essentially without questioning either the plausibility or the coherence of the Aristotelian account.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Patras
- Year dc:date
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Karagiorgou, Marianna
- Καραγιώργου, Μαριάννα
Subjects
dc:subject × 18Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/54647