Back to search

Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)

Dynamic optimization and revenue management: capacity constraints and market competition

Abstract

dc:description

Dynamic pricing of products or services by firms is about them adjusting to market circumstances in a search for the prices that will maximize their intertemporal profits. In the real world, this is a phenomenon more often observed than not. It has always been of use, like in bazaars where stock levels and the time of day have a significant impact on the prices. Today, digital and other technological advancements have given the means to many firms in different markets to successfully implement such methods in more sophisticated ways. Numerous economic sectors currently employ dynamic pricing, like the airline industry, public transportation, hospitality, seasonal goods but also in relation to the rapid growth of e-commerce, online retailers, entertainment and sports events, rideshare services, as well as brands, electricity or other energy markets. This thesis studies the pricing decisions of firms when they have inventories or in other words a fixed capacity that consists of a given number of units, to sell over time. In the first chapter, we present the monopoly problem and the optimal solutions to its finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions. This is a well-studied case in the literature, especially in operations research, where models of dynamic pricing often study a firm with a fixed inventory over a finite horizon. Given that a firm has an inventory, it resorts to price-based revenue management to maximize its intertemporal expected profits as it cannot adjust quantity. In this problem, the optimal price increases in the available time but decreases in the capacity level, and the expected profits increase in both capacity and available time. In the second chapter, we study the effects of capacity constraints on profits and prices in a competitive (strategic) setting. How does the presence of a competitor firm affect the monopoly prices paths? The price will certainly be lower than the monopoly price but, will it be higher or lower than the rival’s price? And how are these prices affected by both firms’ capacities? In our model, formally we assume that only one buyer arrives every period with unit demand and, depending on the prices set, there is a positive probability of no-sale by either firm. Competition takes place in discrete time and there are intertemporal capacity constraints to firms who simultaneously post their prices before observing the buyer’s location in each period. The buyers’ locations are drawn each period from a known distribution. Only one firm may sell in each period, or else, no firm can sell more units than the number of periods left. Firms seek to maximize their intertemporal expected profits and we solve backwards for the equilibrium prices. We characterize the equilibrium price paths, where the two sellers set prices period after period (simultaneously in each period) depending on how capacities evolve stochastically over time. In the third chapter, we extend this model by adding endogenous product differentiation (or locations). We utilize Hotelling’s model in a dynamic framework of a two-stage game where firms can simultaneously first choose their location once within a line segment of unit length, before competing for multiple periods on prices that they simultaneously post each period. Again, firms seek to maximize their intertemporal expected profits and we solve for the equilibrium locations and prices. We examine how different intertemporal capacity constraints affect the location choices and the subsequent equilibrium prices. From the firms’ perspective, we can regard locations as a type of commitment, like an investment, infrastructure, or advertising, that affects differentiation between firms and lasts at least until the end of the second (pricing) stage. We show that capacities’ asymmetry can significantly impact location choices and even force the low-capacity firm at an endpoint with the high-capacity firm in the middle of the market. The latter is willing to locate in the middle of the market with his rival and if necessary, sell some units at marginal cost. Our model considers both locations’ asymmetries and capacities’ asymmetries and produces a rich equilibrium pricing behavior for firms. Given the remaining time, the level of competition increases in reservation price and locations asymmetry but decreases in discount factor, firms’ distance, and capacities’ asymmetry. The firm in the middle has enough market power to dictate pricing strategies and extract more (expected) value from the buyer than its rival at the endpoint. We also show that, if the high-capacity firm is at an endpoint of the market it will post a lower price than the low-capacity firm when the capacities’ asymmetry is high enough. In locationally asymmetric states, we have the firm located in the middle decreasing its price when the reservation price gets high enough, which is the point where the competitive solution is internal and unique. When this happens, the firm in the middle still has an incentive to lower its price to cover the market towards the empty endpoint while, the firm at the other endpoint will lose its market share if it does not follow or will lower its price to preserve its market share, which translates into lower expected value. For a range of the parameter values the optimal policy of the firm in the middle is such that its endpoint market is covered, and for that range this firm gets unresponsive to rival’s price changes. Regarding market structure and coverage, the pattern is always the same: if the reservation price is high enough, then firms find more profitable to undercut their rival but, for low values of reservation price the optimal solution implies local monopolies. For intermediate values we obtain ‘just touching’ local monopolies, and for high values full pledged competition. We identify these thresholds for all states and study the effect of location and capacities’ asymmetries on market coverage.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB)
Year dc:date
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Valaskas, Konstantinos
  • Βαλάσκας, Κωνσταντίνος

Subjects

dc:subject × 18

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/55414

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Valaskas, Konstantinos; Βαλάσκας, Κωνσταντίνος. Dynamic optimization and revenue management: capacity constraints and market competition. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB), 2023. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/55414