National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Εκκλησιαστικά νομικά πρόσωπα και ένδικη προστασία των συνταγματικών δικαιωμάτων
Abstract
dc:description1. Dissertation topic: Ecclesiastical legal persons and legal protection of Constitutional Rights2.Topic selection It is my belief, that what a monk and a student or researcher of science share is that both of them are students of the truth. Just as obedience is practiced always within the Holy Spirit, thus also research is practiced in truth for the advancement of science to the benefit of society. In this Dissertation, I chose out of respect for the institution of the Church, to deal to a greater extent with the research on constitutional rights or the competences of the legal persons of the Church and less on the rights of the vested in habit members of the Orthodox Church of Greece. And this is due to that the Church constitutes, by virtue of its Triadic doctrine, the One and Only God, with three substances, three persons (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit). The very doctrinal nature of the Church is substantiated and expressed via the three persons of God. The Church, projected as an institution in the external world, in the Roman empire, on the occasion of or thanks to the Edict of Milan, constitutes a social phenomenon or social reality, hence it became a legal subject, and by extension a subject of rights. My aim is to attribute the weight to the legal, as collective, personality of the Church, and thus to the protection of collective religious freedom, or otherwise religious freedom when it is expressed collectively, without an infringement or weakening of the substance of individual religious freedom. Yet, I examined and presented, the exercise of collective rights but also competences of ecclesiastical legal persons, in light of the constitutional provisions protecting civil rights, such as the value of the person, personal and religious freedom, the freedom of assembly and association for religious purposes, freedom of speech and not hate-rhetoric or religious bigotry, non–humiliating treatment etc. And this is to be accounted for that, as the light diffuses and penetrates everywhere, thus is also the case with the constitutional, European law and international law provisions which protect such rights, penetrate and enlighten the exercise of collective liberties of the legal persons of the Church, and thus they have to be exercised without suspending civil liberties. 3.Organisation of the subject matter and content of the Dissertation The Constitution of the state defines the form of government, church–state relations, it contains the organizational part, the civil rights, the organs and functioning of the three state powers. The ‘Constitution’ of the Church, is its doctrine, as it is contained in the Holy Scripture, the holy tradition, and the Church canons. The scheme, namely the organizational part and the civil rights, is taken as a given and constituted the basis for my work. The text elaborating my Dissertation includes pre-theory, an introduction and two parts. In the pre-theory a) the pursued aim of the dissertation is set out, b) we state, in summary form, ratione materiae, jurisprudential matters which concerned legal disputes on constitutional rights of the legal persons of the Church of Greece and c) questions are raised to which the dissertation is called upon to answer and elaborate. Such questions pertain to the determination a) of the legal persons of the Orthodox Church of Greece, the regime governing them, and their differentiation from other religious and ecclesiastical legal persons in Greece, b) the constitutional relations of the state and the church, how the legal order of the state co-exists and functions with the legal order of the church, with regard to its legal persons, and c) whether the latter can become bearers of constitutional rights within the national legal order, and by extension bearers of the rights protected by the ECHR, and especially whether they are bearers only of religious freedom or also other constitutional rights. The Introduction comprises the development of two chapters. The first deals with the account of the subject of development and of the structure of the subject matter of the chapters of the two parts, and the second, which is subdivided into four subchapters, deals with the concretization of the concepts and relations referred in the text of the development of the dissertation. We analyse only the concepts of the state, Christianity, the formation of the first ecclesiastical communities, the ecclesiastical legal persons in Greece, which the dissertation deals with in contrast to the religious legal persons and the Old Calendarist ones in the national legal order. Through the analysis of the concepts, the historical review of the establishment and the purpose of the Church, there manifests itself, in a legal framework, the Church’s position as a social phenomenon and a legal subject within the legal order. In the Part One, which is comprised of three chapters, the following is examined: a)The legal position of the Church in the Helladic area, the difference of the ecclesiastical from state power, the regime of the church-state relations in an international level, the determination of their relations according to the degree of state recognition and the protection of religious freedom, the regime of the specific church-state relations in Greece, on a constitutional and legislative level, with reference to the special ecclesiastical regimes in regions of Greece. b) The ecclesiastical legal persons of the Autocephalous Church of Greece. Reference is made to the legal framework of their functioning, their legal personality, to the outline of their central and peripheral organizational structure and administration, their sectoral forms and categories, as well as the ecclesiastical administration of justice by them. C) the ecclesiastical legal persons of special ecclesiastical regime existing and functioning in the national legal order, namely the ecclesiastical administrations of the Archdiocese of Crete, the Metropolises of Dodecanese and the self–governed region of Mount Athos. Reference is made to the legal framework of their functioning, their legal personality, the organizational forms of their legal persons, as well as the administration of ecclesiastical justice by them. In the Part Two we analyse the constitutional rights of the ecclesiastical legal persons, the ones which are compatible to the nature of their institutions, and the purpose served by them, with an introductory reference to the foundations of civil rights, their concept and their legal nature, the distinction of civil from collective rights, the types of the constitutional rights, their recipients, the restrictions in their exercise, the internal and judicial review of acts of the ecclesiastical legal persons by the Church and the State respectively, the ecclesiastical and state supervision in the exercise of their rights, as well as conclusions on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the system for the legal protection of the constitutional rights of ecclesiastical legal persons. Does the Constitution of Greece recognize constitutional rights for ecclesiastical legal persons, and where do they derive from? The answer is affirmative. Constitutional rights, whose bearers there can in principle become the ecclesiastical legal persons concern the legal personality of the church, the individual and collective religious freedom with its manifestations of the freedom of the expression of religious conscience and the freedom of worship, the autonomy in its organization and administration, the self-determination of its members, the lawful judge in the legal disputes which are created with regard to their exercise, the judicial attendance and the fair trial for the protection of their rights, the freedom of association for religious purposes, such as of the participative collective decision–making of the ecclesiastical legal person (synodal administration, metropolitan councils, parish councils, Councils of Elders etc.), of the establishment of NGO’s, of charitable foundations, ecclesiastical foundations etc., their ownership and property, matters of their economic freedom, such as the establishment of companies under conditions of for-profit (and non-profit) character with the purpose of the exploitation of the ecclesiastical property, of public or private contracts, of the implementation of ecclesiastical works, of equality and equal treatment, the right to petition the authorities and of access to administrative records, of ecclesiastical communion and unity with homodox overseas churches, of religious education and teaching, of cooperation and dialogue with the State in common areas of action with the purpose of solidarity and with the aim of the consolidation of social peace and humanitarian aid. Reference is further made also to other constitutional rights, whose bearers there can become collective religious associations and ecclesiastical legal persons, such as the rights of the protection of honor and reputation, the freedom of opinion and the publication of thoughts as well as communication via the radio and television shows. These rights, starting from the freedom of the personality, derive from special manifestations of the latter freedom, such as of religious freedom and the freedom of worship, and mainly derive more specifically from the transition from the first to the second level of religious freedom, namely from individual (positive or negative) religious freedom to collective religious freedom. Does our Constitution recognize a collective religious freedom? The Constitution of Greece does not expressly formulate the concept of collective religious freedom, but the recognition of its exercise is inferred by the wording of article 13 par. 2. As collective religious freedom, we mean the development of collective rights, such as public worship and the participation of the church or religious communities in the legal order of the state, through the acquisition of a legal personality, property, the exercise of economic freedom, through the conclusion of contracts with the state, the implementation of works etc.Professor Ric Torfs distinguishes four levels of religious freedom, as the schematically appear, if we illustrate church-state relations with a pyramid. At the first level, which constitutes the basis of the pyramid must be and remains the individual religious freedom, positive or negative, at the second level there is its homologue [correspondent!], collective religious freedom, which manifests itself as we saw by public worship and the participation of the church in the legal order of the state, the church, that is, or religious communities, within the Greek state. The third level is the one of the internal autonomy of the church which must be recognized to it by the state and be protected, and at the fourth level the state – church relations are elaborated. At the last fourth level the prohibition of the state interference and the claim of neutrality which are intense in the third level of recognition and safeguarding of the internal autonomy of the Church, recede to create an area for a more active participation of the church in areas of cooperation with the state. The conclusion is that, finally, the extent of the recognition by the state of the individual and collective religious freedom, is the one determining church-state relations, which are jeopardized at the fourth level of religious freedom. In the course of the research, it was ascertained that, constitutional rights which derive from individual and collective religious freedom, develop both in the vertical church-state relation, with the rights being projected towards the state, as well as in the horizontal relation between the ecclesiastical legal persons when the church acts as state power, as such which by necessity acts, insofar as it is organized as a Public Law Legal Person (PLLP). Such rights are projected towards hierarchically superior or supervisory legal persons of the Church. It is simply that, pursuant to the latest national legislation, all the court procedural provisions governing the General Government and the PLLP’s are not applied to the church, unless if they stipulate so expressly. This, however, does not deprive the public, regulatory power of the church. Minimal in number are the cases of the conflict of rights or of the third-party effect, and these are mainly at the level of property rights; for example, an ownership right on real property of an ecclesiastical legal person, brought by separate ecclesiastical legal persons. The dissertation examines and presents, however, the exercise of collective rights but also competences of ecclesiastical legal persons, in the light of the constitutional provisions protecting the value of the person, personal and religious freedom, assembly and association for the religious purposes, freedom of speech and not hate rhetoric or religious bigotry, the non–humiliating treatment etc. Just as light diffuses and penetrates everywhere thus also with the constitutional, European law and international provisions protecting individual rights, they penetrate and enlighten the exercise of collective freedoms of the legal persons of the Church, and thus have to be exercised without suspending civil freedoms. An integral part of this study is the reference to the regime of the relations of the Greek state and the church. In principle there is a regime of the ‘state ruling by law’ in the legal relations of the two powers, which however de facto functions as a regime of synallelia (mutual solidarity), at times even homotaxy in their relations. An example of synallelia: the amendment of provisions of the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece pursuant to a proposal by the Church, even in the form of a law bill, via the Ministry of Education in the Parliament for the voting of a formal law. Thus, following the issuance of judgements 1393 and 1394/2017 of the Hellenic Supreme Administrative Court, the Council of State, which found that alien monks have a right to elect but not to be elected members of the Council of Elders of the Monasteries (PLLP) and not of the Hesychasteria (Hermitages) (Private Law Legal Persons), where they inhabit, precisely on the grounds that the Council of State upheld that, the Councils of Elders of the Monasteries at times exercise state power, as PLLP, this was followed by an amendment of the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece, with the enactment of a legislative provision, that only native Greeks are electors and eligible for election as members of the Councils of Elders of their Holy Monasteries. A corresponding provision does not exist in the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece for the members of the parish councils or metropolitan councils of the Church of Greece. An example of Homotaxy: In the Hellenic Code of Immigration of the Ministry of Migration Policy, as an additional term was added for the issuance or the renewal of residence permits for exercise (askesis) or acquaintance with the monastic life, besides the certification by the Monastery on habitation of the Monk or the Probationer, also the consenting opinion of the relevant Metropolitan, that the Monk or the Probationer inhabits in the Monastery for exercise (askesis) or acquaintance with the monastic life. In this manner the Metropolitan becomes the right arm of the decentralized administration, binding it unilaterally, insofar as a negative consenting opinion thereof, notwithstanding the existing certification by the Monastery, excludes the issuance or renewal by the Administration of the residence permit of the alien monk. Upon this amendment, there were cases, where the Metropolitan, as a single–person organ of the ecclesiastical legal person of the Metropolis, issued a negative administrative act, founded on spiritual grounds or grounds unrelated to the condition of the law, resulting in the risk of the removal of the alien monk or probationer from his Monastery or even his deportation from the Country. Such cases, may constitute either an abuse of power, or a functional division of the organs of ecclesiastical administration, similar, in our view, to the functional division of the organs of administration, as developed within the classical theory of the international lawyer Scelle, which the Hellenic Council of State has been occupied with since the 1980s, in order to explain mixed legal persons and the functional acts of the Administration. In conclusion, when to the Church is attributed, a state or public power, then the Church, and its legal persons, are more the recipients of rights rather than their subjects. Conversely, when the church–state relations remain distinct, namely when they enter into contract to render their distinct and common areas of action, without the one interfering with the action area of the other, then they render unto Cesar the things of Cesar and unto God the things of God. Then the Church is more of a bearer rather than a recipient of rights. Imperative remains, however, the need that the Church, in its statutory organization and administration includes all its orders, whose needs it has to fulfil. If one looks into the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece (L. 590/1977), he will ascertain that, out of the 75 articles of the law, 42 (arts. 4-35, 51-56, 68-73) regulate the matters of the election, competences and duties of the Archierarchs, the Standing Holy Synod and the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the Church of Greece. The election of the commissioners of the parishes, up to and including the Archbishop, excludes the participation in it of the fullness of the church, the devotees, for whom the Church exists. Thus, the numerus clausus in the election of spiritual and administrative organs of the Church, the to a great extent abolishment of the internal autonomy of the distinct order of monks, constitute arrangements or practices raising obstacles in the fulfilment of the mission of the Church, as it was delivered to us from the early Christian years. In contrast, in the Church of Cyprus, as we saw recently, but also in other Patriarchates the participation of devotees is existent in the election of the Primate of the Church. Parallel to the analysis of constitutional rights, we elaborate the judicial review of their protection, when they are infringed either by the state or by the senior or supervisory ecclesiastical authorities. In the study we cite national case law, ECtHR case law, certain judgements of the CEU, as well as third-country courts, on matters of rights arising from freedom of religion. As to the judicial review of the acts of ecclesiastical authorities and its scope, three approaches have been formulated on a European level, as analyzed by Professor Rick Torfs. The first approach limits the review to the judgement of the court, where the contested act has been taken by the competent ecclesiastical authority, in which case the judge proceeds to a review of competence. The second proceeds to the investigation whether the measure or the decision by the competent ecclesiastical authority, is in compliance with the rules of functioning of the authority, which acted in the sphere of its internal autonomy, and then at this stage there are reviewed also the procedural rules, the infringement of law, besides the non-competence. In the third approach, the judge does not review only the competence and the procedural rules, the infringement of law, but reviews, whether these procedures are satisfactory from the aspect of state and European law. Thus, for example, it is examined, reviewed whether the procedural rules which were observed by the Church or the religious community, are in accordance with the procedural rules of the national legal order and the guarantees laid down especially by articles 6, 9, 11, 14 ECHR. The national courts, and especially the Council of State, follow primarily the third approach, often, though, they dismiss as inadmissible petitions for annulment, on the basis of the nature of the content (spiritual or administrative) of the dispute in question, regardless of the nature of the contested right and the legal implications of the contested act or omission in the public or private space. The study, concludes with two proposals. The first proposal is the one of the a) most effective judicial protection de lege lata, in light of the constitutional principles, such as of proportionality, and of the fundamental rights of the ECHR, modeled on judgments mainly of the ECHR, the German federal constitutional court and the French Conseil d’ Etat. The Hellenic Council of State, prior to the review of the grounds for annulment of the act alleged to infringe a substantive right, reviewing the admissibility, distinguishes whether the contested act is of spiritual content or not, even if the competence of its issue is provided for by a state provision, regardless of the consequences of administrative nature caused by it or the harm to the substantive right and its nature. Conversely, the ECtHR, distinguishes, whether the disputes in question have implications of administrative nature or the existence of an individual right is jeopardized, so that the judicial review is of decisive significance in relation to the right or the accusation, regardless of the character of the content of the dispute, provided that a substantive right of the applicant natural or legal person is contested. The German constitutional court moved from the jurisprudential principle of the divided areas to the one of the fair weighting of interests. The judge is called upon to coordinate, as the applier of the law, the guarantees of the institutional freedom of the Church with the due state protection of constitutionally enshrined rights and freedoms, which may override in terms of the importance of their legal protection the right of self-government. The freedom, i.e., of the self-government of the church may not and must not repeal or negate provisions and arrangements recognizing and determining a specific constitutional right, altering in this manner its hard core or functioning to the detriment of the purpose of the public service performed by the church within the standing legislative regime. The ends of public service must serve the principle of proportionality, prior hearing, the continuity of the administration, the observance of the legality principle, namely the non-infringement of law, the lawful reasoning in the exercise of the binding competence of the administration or the non-excess of the outer boundaries of discretion, the respect for the legitimate expectations of the governed in the administration etc., in the exercise of the latter’s discretion. If also the domestic judge applies these jurisprudential principles of the ECtHR and the German Federal Constitutional Court, he shall be released from principles why until now he has been applying, pursuant to which he is called to incise on virtually indiscernible, even by the religious minister, areas of internal or external matters of the Church. A criterion of the court-procedural requirements of the granting of legal protection, must be by itself the contested right, its nature, its restrictions under the law, its compatibility, under the principle of proportionality to the end of the ecclesiastical legal person in which he is a member, as also the legal effects produced by its contestation in the area of public or even private law. An example of pathology in the administration of both state justice and ecclesiastical justice is the case, where applicable, of the lack of subjective and objective impartiality. In the area of ecclesiastical justice, I am referring for example to the case of ecclesiastical judges of the local episcopal courts, where the very same persons commence the ecclesiastical penal prosecution, conduct the inquiry or rule on inquisitorial acts of the ecclesiastical inquisitors, try with a casting vote in the Episcopal court, and refer to a higher Synodal Court, where they rule on a guilty sentence which is higher than the one which they themselves can inflict, even for offences in which the victim is alleged to be the Bishops themselves, who instituted the ecclesiastical penal prosecution or even tried the case. The Metropolitans of the Synodal courts many times receive exhortations of archierarchs to convict the disciplinarily prosecuted, by one of their colleagues, archierarch, cleric or monk, whom they themselves as his prosecutors, referred to a Synodal Court for a severer punishment to be inflicted upon him. The system of the administration of Ecclesiastical Justice is ailing, as it stands and is applied in the framework of L. 5385/1932, which has been found in many of its provisions as unconstitutional. Its non-amendment further stumbles upon the dissent as to the participation or not in the proposals of its legislative provision also by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, owing to the application of the law in the Metropolises of the New Territories or by analogy also in the more special ecclesiastical regimes, of Crete, the Dodecanese, which fall under the supervision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In the area of state justice, of concern as to the securing of impartiality is the fact of the participation equally in the session of the processing of a Presidential Decree on the dissolution of a Holy Monastery, as also in the session of the hearing of a petition for annulment against the very same President Decree, of a judge, in the status of President in both the sessions, namely of the administrative processing of the legality of the Presidential Decree and the judicial composition of adjudication on the administrative act in question, which has as foundation the said PD, which is jointly contested with regard to its legislative delegation, and its concordance or not to the Constitution and the European and international law, by a petition for annulment or other legal remedy. Related rulings are the ECtHR judgement Procola v. Luxembourg, 28.09.1995, and ruling under no. 15/2017 of the Supreme Special Court a contrario, wherein they found a lack of impartiality, when in the same person coincide consultative and judicial duties, concerning the judgment of the constitutionality of a regulatory decree. When, a Council of State President ex cathedra, during the delivery of a report by the Rapporteur on a judicial case, verbally stresses interferingly, that monks are obligated to obedience generally and vaguely, a legal content is thereby attributed to an ecclesiastical conduct. If obedience or indigence, which are virtues, become legal obligations and conditions, in the major premise of the judicial syllogism, any possible lack or deficient fulfilment thereof will lead to a judicial conclusion, which will end at the obedience to the dissolution of an ecclesiastical legal person or to the forced movement of an ecclesiastical community from its seat to another, based on an unconditional consenting opinion of a Metropolitan, and on the abolishment of the religious freedom of the selection of the place of exercise or acquaintance with the monastic / ecclesiastical / religious life. Such a legal obligation to obedience, contravenes the very holy canons of the Orthodox Church, such as the 24th canon of the 4th Ecumenical Council, which starts that ‘the once established monasteries, by consent of a bishop, shall perpetually remain monasteries’. However, in the name of an antidoctrinal and illiberal obedience to one-person or even collective organs of the church, also the crusades took place, with the known results of armed violence. Today there is exercise also of unarmed violence, when we have a violation of the core of individual religious freedom, without which there is no safeguard either of the right to faith or unfaith, nor of the right to the organization and autonomy of the church. It is tragic to ascertain, as it is analyzed in the dissertation, that conditions are set, beyond the law and the holy canons, by representatives of ecclesiastical legal persons, for them to consent, to a candidate or member of an ecclesiastical community, with regard to his inclusion therein or his dismissal or movement to another ecclesiastical community. Hate rhetoric’s further, constitute humiliating, torturous, and inhuman behaviors, or behaviors exuding religious bigotry, and do not have a place primarily in the area of the church. If delinquent behaviors, as the above, elude equally the state control (administrative and judicial), on the grounds of an absolute neutrality of the state in relation to ecclesiastical power, as also the intra-ecclesiastical control, based upon a coercive command and not within Holy Spirit of obedience, then what would be the difference as for the recipients of the rights (of state and church), between democracy and anarchy, freedom and servitude, arbitrariness and legality, power from abuse in its exercise? The second proposal is the one of the b) more effective legislative protection de lege ferenda, with the aim that the study contributes, to the extent possible, to the discipline of law and justice. 4.What does this dissertation contribute to the art and science? The study on the one hand assembles the Constitutional rights whose bearers can be on conditions the ecclesiastical legal persons, on the other hand it pursues to constitute a springboard a) for the redetermination of the position of the church and the redelineation of its law, within the Greek State, as well as b) for the modern expression of the Church’s vision for the human being and society. I believe, and so propose, that as the constitutional and legislative framework today, is not a clear landscape on the grounds which I explained, the arrangement of church–state relations is necessary through a (public) contract between them, which will be provided for constitutionally in article 3 of the Constitution. This contract will have to be fundamental, in which will participate on equal terms the Church and the State, as equivalent, but different sources of primary power, and it is therein where will be determined, not merely the property rights, since until today, only on these matters the two powers enter into contract, but also substantive rights, competences and obligations. For example, a substantive right of such an arrangement and enshrinement, can be the right of cooperation and dialogue of the Church with the State and the corresponding obligation of the state to the cooperation with the church and the denominations, in common action areas, such as social welfare, education etc. A model for this legislative arrangement is article 17.3 TFEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (as elaborated in pages 384-386 of the dissertation).If in fact under the model of the Convention of the Cretan State with the Ecumenical Patriarchate (14.10.1900, L. 276/1900 on the Statutory Charter of the Church of Crete enforcing the convention), participants in the Convention being proposed, are both the very Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of Crete, therein there will be an application also of the doctrinal unity of the churches, which is declared in article 3 of the Constitution, a unity which in the wording of the Constitution in fact, precedes, but also is doctrinally superior as it constitutes a condition, also of the very autocephaly of the Churches, as the Orthodox church exists institutionally, for as long as it is doctrinally unified and recognized by all homodox Churches (just as the branches constitute a continuation of the same tree), otherwise it constitutes a religious community capable of being recognized as a legal person or association of persons by the state and is linked doctrinally to another confession of faith. In this manner, and after this convention has been ratified with by an (enforcing the terms of the Convention) law of Parliament, the ecclesiastical statutory legislation will not be able to change unilaterally, either by the state, or by the church, but within the framework of a convention which will be drafted, by analogy to the Statutory Charter of the Church of Crete (L. 276/1900), which provided in its ultimate provision the possibility of the amendment of its provisions, only following an agreement between the Eparchial Synod and the Cretan State. Thus, I believe, that the multitude of laws will be combatted, and the compliance of the contracting authorities with the agreed upon covenants will be attained, after the contractual relationship of the parties will have been previously regulatorily defined in a provision of the Constitution. Most of all, the nomocanonical framework of the autonomy of the Church of Greece will be determined. A safeguard for the observance of the agreed upon covenants will be the judicial review (pages 317-318 of the dissertation) of the observance of the principle of legality and regularity respectively of the two powers, under the principle of Roman law patere legem quam ipse fesisti (obey the law that you yourself have forged) (pages 390-391 of the dissertation), which constitutes a foundation of the rule of law, applied also by the CEU, such as in the case of public contracts (page 14 of the dissertation). I believe that the lifeless climate of an absolute neutrality of the state towards the church or the religious communities is not assimilated by social reality in Greece. My ascertainment in question is rendered more emphatic by the allegation, insofar as it applies, that in essence the legal personality of the Church is the legal projection of its social reality. In summary, on the basis of the documentation and evidence of the research material on the subject of the dissertation, indubitably the Church and its legal persons: a) when they function as religious establishments [kathidrymata] under their spiritual power, are bearers of constitutional rights, the ones compatible to the nature of the specific institution in which they are included and to the aims which this institution serves. Thus, the theory of the ‘special relations of power’ pursuant to which, the fundamental rights are not applicable in the interior of certain public institutions, cannot survive in the light of article 25 par. 1 section aˊ of the Constitution, in conjunction to the observance of the principle of proportionality of section dˊ of the same article, b) when they function as administrative authorities with regulatory authority, they are recipients of the constitutional rights.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Giakoumakis, Antonios
- Γιακουμάκης, Αντώνιος
Subjects
dc:subject × 19- Εκκλησιαστικά νομικά πρόσωπα
- Ατομικά και συλλογικά δικαιώματα
- Ένδικη προστασία δικαιωμάτων
- Συλλογική θρησκευτική ελευθερία
- Ατομική θρησκευτική ελευθερία
- Ecclesiastical legal persons
- Legal protection of constitutional rights of church entities
- Collective religious freedom
- Individual religious freedom
- Personnes morales ecclésiastiques
- Protection judiciaire des droits
- Liberté religieuse individuelle
- Liberté religieuse collective
- Νομική Επιστήμη
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Νομική επιστήμη, διεπιστημονική προσέγγιση
- Law
- Social Sciences
- Law, interdisciplinary
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/55825