National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)
Resilience assessment of cyber-physical water systems
Abstract
dc:descriptionInfrastructure planning and management is concerned with the longer term, over a design horizon that typically, for urban water systems, (UWSs) extends to decades (25-50 years). That means that UWSs will inevitably be subjected to unknown, and possibly unknowable at the design/planning stage, future pressures. These pressures include hydro-climatic changes and associated uncertainty that affect water supply in both quantity and acceptable quality levels, as well as demographic and socioeconomic trends (e.g., urban growth, increasing urbanization, changing water demand patterns) affecting water demand, and limited investments affecting the renewal rates and maintenance levels of infrastructure. An increasingly volatile environment is now emerging, challenging conventional planning which relies on the ability to anticipate future change. Thus, a paradigm shift is required for strategic planning. The notion of designing systems with the goal to be ‘fail-safe’ against all anticipated eventualities should be revisited, and a new design goal towards resilient systems which can withstand stresses by being ‘safe-to-fail’, should be set (Butler et al. 2017).Even though resilience is a term that has been dominating the policy discourse and scientific literature across a multitude of domains in recent years, it remains rather elusive in definition. Scholars have suggested several definitions, and while these differ in nuances, most revolve around two broad categories, around ‘engineering’ or ‘ecological’ notions respectively (Holling 1996); the former conceptualizes resilience as the speed of return or recovery ability of a system to nominal conditions after a perturbation, and the latter the ability of a system to withstand and adapt to stress, maintaining a level of function as disturbance unfolds. Specifically, for the water sector, there exist many definitions of resilience and related quantification approaches. These are mostly dependent on what type of system is examined and simulated, and how performance is measured. Some approaches also account for uncertainty in the quantification of resilience, and most are concerned with scenarios of single types of stressors. What is still an open topic in the literature, is a generic, system- and model- agnostic, indicator-flexible, and uncertainty-aware operational definition of resilience for urban water systems (and beyond that, applicable to other engineering systems), able to address scenarios that can range from a single stressor to a multitude of parameters changing bundled up in a whole’ future world view’ stressing the system. Within this context, the ongoing digitalization of the water sector poses new challenges, with the integration of new smart technologies and internet connectivity, transforms urban water systems to complex entities termed cyber-physical systems, or CPSs (i.e., systems that integrate physical processes with computational engineered systems, for remote control, monitoring, analytics etc.). The cyber-physical nature of UWSs was previously rarely addressed in the context of resilience assessment and risk management, although it expands the UWS threat landscape to completely new hazards: those of cyber attacks. Such attacks on CPSs almost always have physical consequences (e.g., disruption of operation), therefore are termed cyber-physical attacks. Their threat is ever-growing, with a recent escalation of incidents. The potential dire consequences (e.g., supply cut-off, waste of recourses, economic and reputational losses) have alerted the water sector and prompted novel research initiatives towards the cyber-security of water systems. Especially concerning are events where cyber-physical attacks can be coupled with other physical attack types that can pose risk to the health and safety of consumers for maximum disruption (e.g., cyber-physical attacks on the contamination warning system of a water distribution network employing water quality sensors combined with backflow injection attacks to contaminate the network) which prompted the expansion of the definition and scope of cyber-physical attacks in this thesis to address them. Yet, there is still a significant gap in theory and practice, regarding the water’s sector capabilities to model water systems as true cyber-physical systems, with a high fidelity representation of the complex interactions and feedback loops between the control and monitoring hardware and software and the physical real-world processes that are needed to really assess the behaviour of water CPSs during cyber-physical attacks. Only recently have relevant tools emerged in research, for a subset of water system types, such as water distribution networks, with models like epanetCPA (Taormina et al. 2017) and DHALSIM (Murillo et al. 2023). Furthermore, even with novel modelling capabilities, there are still a lot of open issues, like water quality aspects in cyber-physical simulation and optimization of the design of water quality sensor networks to be resilient against cyber-physical attacks. This thesis has three objectives: a) formulate a generic, system- and model- agnostic, indicator-flexible, and uncertainty-aware operational definition of resilience for urban water systems, b) advance the conceptualization of water distribution networks as cyber-physical systems and develop modelling tools for simulation of their operation as well as the impact of cyber-physical attacks, and c) systematically assess resilience of water CPSs against complex cyber-physical attacks, that specifically hamper the water quality and endanger the health of consumers, and develop a novel design tool for resilient water quality sensor placement to aid in securing water CPSs. The first objective is tackled by articulating a resilience assessment framework, based on an operationalizable definition, as ‘the degree to which a system continuous to perform under progressively increasing disturbance’. Performance is quantified via the usage of suitable metrics that evaluate ‘the ability of the system to consistently deliver its objectives, considered over a timespan’ (i.e., an expanded reliability indicator). Disturbance is modelled with scenarios that are formed as future, uncertainty aware, world views, combining a multitude of changing parameters that affect the system from its internal., external and transactional realm (scenarios are also adaptable to single stressors). By stress-testing the system against scenarios and evaluating performance, resilience profile graphs can be formed, from which resilience is assessed, and different design configurations can be compared. Even though uncertain future conditions are already represented into the formulation of exploratory and speculative scenarios that are formed, to encapsulate uncertainty in the resilience metric per se, scenarios can incorporate stochastic elements, generating a ‘cloud’ of realizations (with performance evaluation) per scenario type. By statistically accounting for performance quantiles across scenario realizations, performance curves for confidence intervals can be examined, to assess resilience under an uncertainty-aware lens. The framework is demonstrated in a real-world case, and with multiple tools in a modelling chain in a source-to-tap manner. For the second objective, we develop in this thesis a state-of-the-art cyber-physical stress-testing platform, named RISKNOUGHT that conceptualizes and simulates water distribution systems (WDNs), a key component of any UWS, as cyber-physical systems. This is achieved by coupling two models, one for the cyber layer (sensors, actuators, control logic, etc.) and one for the physical layer (hydraulic processes) and simulate their interactions and feedback loops. The platform is able to assess the impacts cyber-physical attacks (such as denial-of -service attacks, sensor manipulation through man-in-the-middle-attacks, etc.) have on the operation of the WDN. The water quality aspect of a simulation is also addressed by RISKNOUGHT, and to the author’s best knowledge is the first tool capable of a) simulating effects on water quality by cyber-physical attacks that are combined with deliberate contamination of the WDN, and b) model a contamination warning system, with water quality monitoring sensors and contamination response measures as part of the CPS control logic. Finally, the third objective, integrates the thesis outcomes on the resilience assessment methodology and the development of tools for water CPSs. Building on the ability to simulate cyber-physical attacks to WDNs and the novel methodology to systematically stress-test the system against such scenarios of operational disturbances (both developed as part of this research), we then focus on a challenging application, which is highly relevant for water utilities’ security and strategic risk planning: that of resilience assessment (through a multitude of suitable metrics) of alternative water quality sensor placement strategies taking into consideration the threat of cyber-physical attacks that target the sensors’ capability to detect contaminants (e.g., by manipulating the transmitted quality readings) while deliberately contaminating the WDN with a harmful substance. The insights gained through this application, fostered the development of a novel water quality sensor placement strategy that optimizes the CWS’s resilience against cyber-physical attacks. The strategy can be applied in both the problem of generating from scratch a new, resilient sensor topology, or in the upgrade case of an existing topology with new sensors. The outcomes of the research carried out within this PhD endeavour are meant to support the strategic risk planning and management, and help water companies design more resilient future water systems and services.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)
- Year dc:date
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Nikolopoulos, Dionysios
- Νικολόπουλος, Διονύσιος
Subjects
dc:subject × 29- Ανθεκτικότητα
- Κυβερνο-φυσικές επιθέσεις
- Κυβερνο-φυσικά συστήματα
- Υποδομές νερού
- Προστασία κρίσιμων υποδομών
- Αβεβαιότητα
- Υποστήριξη αποφάσεων
- Στρατηγικός σχεδιασμός
- Συστήματα αστικού νερού
- Βέλτιστη τοποθέτηση αισθητήρων ποιότητας νερού
- Resilience
- Cyber-physical attacks
- Cyber-physical systems
- Water infrastructure
- Critical infrastructure protection
- Uncertainty
- Decision support
- Strategic planning
- Urban water systems
- Water quality sensor placement
- Επιστήμη Πολιτικού Μηχανικού
- Επιστήμες Μηχανικού και Τεχνολογία
- Πολιτική μηχανική
- Άλλες Επιστήμες Μηχανικού και Τεχνολογίες
- Μηχανική, διεπιστημονική προσέγγιση
- Civil Engineering
- Engineering and Technology
- Other Engineering and Technologies
- Engineering, interdisciplinary
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/55981