National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
The concept of affect through the lens of intensity and becoming: a philosophical inquiry in Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari
Abstract
dc:descriptionIn the current dissertation, I analyze the concept of affect as it appears in the philosophies of Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. After putting forward the Spinozian conception of affect as a modification of immanent substance, I explore the repercussions of affect being a variation of intensity in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Intensity, or difference according to Deleuze and Guattari, is a metaphysical element that appears in a triadic scheme along the virtual and the actual. Intensity denotes a power producing novelty by virtue of disjunctively synthesizing heterogeneities under its characteristic of tending towards a limit. In aesthetics, intensity characterizes the ever-receding shared genetic moment of sensibility and ideality as the limit of both. Following the above, affect denotes a variation of the genetic limit of sensibility and ideality under sensibility’s creative function. It is analyzed as being defined in reference to an intensive zero point in which the repetition of habit is conditioned by the novelty of Deleuze’s third synthesis of time, Death, where the unity of actual, extended entities appears dissolved into the singularities from which it arises. Affect is thus understood as a primary novelty or difference that conditions the appearance of repetitive, habitual ways of being. The ethical significance of affect is subsequently considered as related to what Deleuze and Guattari name becoming-minor. This correlation follows directly by the metaphysics of intensity as an exposition of the genetic preconditions of actual unified entities and that exposes the dynamism underlying seemingly unified objects and subjects by connecting them to the genetic processes by which they came to be. Finally, I analyze the synthesizing function of affect as combining the in-itself-ness of difference and the Humean principle of the externality of relations. Neither interior nor exterior affect exists at the middle point, where novelty produces new relations and their corresponding terms. The association of affect and emotions is evaluated as relating to their joint de-subjectifying function, which is best exemplified in the affirmative functions of pain and defacialization. Passing from its immanent function in Spinoza to its metahuman function in Deleuze and Guattari affect denotes the function of dynamism, novelty and creation.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Gounari, Sotiria-Ismini
- Γούναρη, Σωτηρία-Ισμήνη
Subjects
dc:subject × 20- Συναίσθημα
- Ένταση
- Γίγνεσθαι
- Μειονότητα
- Ντελέζ, Ζιλ
- Γκουατταρί, Φελίξ
- Σπινόζα, Μπαρούχ
- Affect
- Intensity
- Becoming
- Minority
- Deleuze, Gilles
- Guattari, Félix
- Spinoza, Baruch (1642-1677)
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/55983