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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Liability of supervisory and resolution authorities in the European Banking Union: the escape room of the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ test, compensatory immunity and composite procedures and the unspoken loopholes in the protection of fundamental rights

Abstract

dc:description

The well-known concept of non-contractual liability constitutes the beating heart of this Thesis. In particular, the research topic of the Thesis is narrowed down to the complex realm of the non-contractual liability of the financial authorities, namely the supervisory and resolution authorities on EU and national level. The Thesis research pinpoints fundamental aspects of the statutory provisions and the pertinent case-law governing the non-contractual liability on Union level, as well as on Greek law level, whilst the status quo in other EU jurisdictions is also examined. Financial authorities, such as central banks, regulatory agencies, and supervisory bodies, play a crucial role in maintaining the stability and efficiency of the financial system. Their actions encompass a wide range of activities, including setting monetary policy, overseeing banks and financial institutions, and enforcing compliance with regulatory standards or taking resolution action. As supervisory bodies tasked with overseeing and ensuring the stability and integrity of financial markets, these authorities wield considerable power and influence. While their primary objective is to safeguard the overall stability and protect the interests of various stakeholders, there are instances where their decisions or omissions can result in harm to individuals, market participants, or the broader economy. The Thesis provides an answer to the dilemma of whether the financial authorities should enjoy immunity from liability, or they should be held liable for the damage they caused during the performance of their duties. It also focuses on the potential limitations that are applied to the liability of the financial authorities by exploring the question of whether the current liability framework offers for ‘too much or too little’ liability, analysing also the compensatory immunity granted to financial authorities when a guarantee scheme is in place and the unspoken loopholes in the protection of the right to property which emerge in the context of the EU resolution framework, and the bail-in tool. The Thesis further devotes particular attention to identifying accountability gaps between the ECB and respective competent national authorities which should be bridged whereas it equally puts great emphasis on the challenging issue of effective judicial protection in the composite procedures.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Anastopoulou, Elli-Kyriaki
  • Αναστοπούλου, Έλλη-Κυριακή

Subjects

dc:subject × 41

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/56498

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Anastopoulou, Elli-Kyriaki; Αναστοπούλου, Έλλη-Κυριακή. Liability of supervisory and resolution authorities in the European Banking Union: the escape room of the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ test, compensatory immunity and composite procedures and the unspoken loopholes in the protection of fundamental rights. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/56498