University of Crete (UOC)
Η διάκριση γεγονότων - αξιών και η αντικειμενικότητα της επιστήμης
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe present study focuses on the problem of the objectivity of scientific knowledge, and in particular on the way in which the concept of fact is – scientifically – constructed from the mid-19th century onwards, when, with the development of non-Euclidean geometries and the gradual prevalence of atomism in chemistry, the Newtonian framework of understanding the world is deconstructed. The question that arises is whether and how the fact-value distinction is now attempted in the philosophy of science. The concept of objectivity is here inextricably linked with that of the value freedom of science. And in the light of this basic question the thesis discusses the debate over science and values. Three main milestones - on the historical axis - of this debate are distinguished: a) Henri Poincaré’s and Pierre Duhem’s conventionalism at the end of nineteenth century; b) the problem of the empirical foundation of knowledge, as reflected in the work of Carnap; and finally, c) the historicist turn that takes place from the sixties onwards, with Kuhn's critique and Laudan's normative naturalism. It is then that the arguments that would later dominate the philosophical debate about the role of values in science are developed, as argued, while the evolution of this debate, as it is conducted today, between those who reject the ideal of the value freedom of science and those who continue to support it, is more systematically examined. The thesis discusses the problem of the underdetermination of scientific theories by data. It focuses on the debate that has begun about the 'inductive risk' or the risk of error involved in accepting or rejecting a scientific proposition, as well as the problem of distinguishing between epistemic and non-scientific values and the language (or thickness of concepts) of science. But it also argues that there is a huge confusion at the level of the meanings or the language used by those involved in this debate today, which often makes the differences between them unclear. This is confirmed by the alternative ideals they propose too: they are not in fact opposed or antagonistic to the ideal of evaluative freedom, but some extensions of it - or mainly complementary ideals. The objectivity of science seems finally to be grounded in a dual or combined justification of presuppositions and values, which, however, presupposes a distinction between epistemic and social values.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Crete (UOC)
- Year dc:date
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Antiochou, Konstantina
- Αντιόχου, Κωνσταντίνα
Subjects
dc:subject × 16- Φιλοσοφία επιστήμης
- Αντικειμενικότητα
- Αξιολογική ελευθερία
- Γεγονότα-αξίες
- Philosophy of science
- Objectivity
- Value freedom
- Fact-value
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Ιστορία και Φιλοσοφία της επιστήμης
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- History and Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/56985