National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Μεθοδολογικές, μεταφυσικές και ανθρωπολογικές συνιστώσες της καρτεσιανής ηθικής και σύγχρονες αξιοποιήσεις της
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe first chapter is divided into four separate subchapters. In the first subchapter (1.1 Why we need a method?) we attempt to trace the reasons why Descartes considered it imperative to have a method, while in the second subchapter (1.2 The concepts of method) we roughly analyse the main concepts of method (intuition, deduction, enumeration or induction), as analyzed by the French philosopher in his juvenile and ultimately incomplete Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1619-1628), to arrive at the third subchapter (1.3 Mathematics and mathesis universalis), in which we try to highlight the relationship between method and mathematics, as well as the important concept of mathesis universalis, a concept that is mentioned only once in Descartes' published writings, in the fourth rule of the Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Finally, the chapter closes with the fourth subchapter (1.4 The Reconstruction of Method in the Discourse on the Method). In this subchapter, we attempt to highlight the fact that the Cartesian method is readjusted according to the questions posed by each science. Thus, in the Discourse on the Method (1637), i.e. an introduction to three discourses on physics (Dioptrics, Geometry, Meteors), Descartes introduces the notion of hypothesis as a methodological tool, adapting, as we have said, the method itself, which remains rigorous on the one hand, but which also responds to the needs of answering individual questions.The aim of the first chapter is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Cartesian method. The first chapter is essentially an 'introduction' to the second chapter, in which we attempt to see how the method is applied to ethics. But in order to see whether it applies to ethics, we must first understand what method is and how it unfolds initially, and is then rearranged at a first level, in the Discourse on the Method, and then move on to ethics, in order to examine whether the method ultimately applies there as well, and if so, in what way.In the first subchapter of the second chapter (2.1 Cartesian ethics), which is divided into two subchapters (2.1.1 Early ethics) and (2.1.2 Late ethics), an attempt is made to reconstruct the body of texts that together constitute what we will call Cartesian moral philosophy. Further, we divide Cartesian ethics into two distinct parts, namely, early and late ethics, based on the different types of certainty of each ethic. The corpus of texts constituting the early ethics is characterized by moral certainty while the corresponding corpus of texts constituting the late ethics is characterized by metaphysical certainty. The next subchapter (2.2 The search for method in Cartesian ethics) is the conclusion of the effort that began with the writing of the first chapter. The research question that runs through the first two chapters is whether Cartesian method still exists in Cartesian ethics, and if it does, how we can locate it. Having therefore said what the method is and pointed out the fact that it can be adapted according to the questions, we have set up the scope of our search by defining precisely which texts constitute Cartesian ethics. Thus, we are now in a position to investigate ethics itself, concluding that the method still exists, in the way we describe in that subsection (2.2). In the first subchapter of the third chapter (3.1 The union and interaction of soul and body in man), we address a topic which has concerned, in general, all Descartes scholars, namely the issue of the union and interaction of soul and body in the case of man. How do we pass from the famous Cartesian dualism to the interaction of two distinct substances? The answer concerns us because, as we will discuss later in the paper, passions have a physical dimension, although they are "felt" by the soul. Therefore, in order to explain how passions manifest, we must investigate the human being himself and the way in which he is composed of soul and body. The next subchapter (3.2 Cartesian physiology) deals with Cartesian physiology and is divided into several subchapters (3.2.1 Anatomy, 3.2.2 The mechanical character of Cartesian physiology, 3. 2.3 Basic terms of Cartesian physiology, 3.2.3.1 The pineal gland, 3.2.3.2 Animal spirits, 3.2.4 The principle of life in Cartesian physiology, 3.2.5 En physicien, 3.2.6 Institution de la nature). The aim of the subchapter is to study Cartesian physiology in depth because it is an integral part of the study of the passions. Thus, in the third subchapter of the present chapter (3.3 The Passions of the Soul) we move on to a commentary on The Passions of the Soul, Descartes' preeminent treatise on moral philosophy. After considering the reasons why the French philosopher chooses to write the Passions of the Soul at this particular point in time, we attempt to describe in a rough way the general intellectual, -mainly-, context in which the treatise takes place. Next, we provide a brief description of the principles of the classification of the passions, as well as a description of the six primary passions (admiration, love, hate, desire, joy, sorrow), with the main one being the passion of admiration. Subchapter 3.4 (The fundamental concepts of Cartesian ethics) is a very crucial point of the work, because it attempts first to find and then to analyse the basic concepts of Cartesian ethics, namely virtue, happiness, the supreme good (3.4.1) and wisdom (3.4.2). Understanding these concepts is of immense importance, because without them we cannot understand Cartesian ethics as a whole and, more importantly, answer the second main research question of our paper, which is none other than how to deal with, or, treat, the passions. The answer to the above question is given in the fifth and last subchapter of chapter three (3.5.1 The cure of manifested passions) in which a distinction is made between the way Descartes deals with unpleasant passions. The French philosopher attempts to cure the unpleasant passions either during their manifestation [3.5.1 The cure of manifested passions, 3.5.1.2 Effort (industrie) and Habit (habitude), 3.5.1.3 Intellectual emotions (émotions intellectuelles) and internal emotions (émotions intérieures)], or before they manifest [3.5.2 Regulating our desires: The passion and virtue of generosity (générosité)]. In the fourth and final chapter of our paper, we study two cases in which Cartesian ethics is fruitfully exploited in the work of contemporary scholars. The first case (4.1) is that of André Comte-Sponville, who in his Short Treatise on Great Virtues (1995) mentions and exploits Cartesian generosity in the context of his own analysis of the virtue of generosity. The second instance of the utilization of Cartesian ethics (4.2) is that of Corine Pelluchon, who in the Ethics of Consideration (2018) also refers to Cartesian generosity and incorporates it in the context of developing her own theory related to an ethics of consideration, as the title of the book suggests.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Azaizes, Alexandros
- Αζαϊζές, Αλέξανδρος
Subjects
dc:subject × 31- Ηθική
- Μέθοδος
- Έξη
- Βεβαιότητα
- Φυσιολογία
- Πάθη
- Θεραπεία
- Αρετή
- Ευδαιμονία
- Σοφία
- Γενναιοφροσύνη
- Descartes René
- Comte-Sponville André
- Pelluchon Corine
- Ethics
- Method
- Habit
- Certainty
- Physiology
- Passions
- Treatment
- Virtue
- Happiness
- Wisdom
- Generosity
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/58485