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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Levels, decomposition and mechanistic explanation in biological systems: the case of cognitive science

Abstract

dc:description

Few phenomena are as intriguing and enigmatic as the ones that constitute mentality, and investigating them as behaviors of biological organisms (humans, in this case) poses an enormous challenge for the sciences of the mind. These sciences, collectively known as cognitive science, form an umbrella that embraces the study of mental phenomena. It is in this field that the idea for the new-mechanistic model of explanation tests its limits, as it must not only tame the explanatory complexity of biology but also delve deep into the mysteries of the mind. It is into these deep intellectual waters that the present dissertation descends. This inquiry targets various interconnected issues: Can the new-mechanistic explanatory framework be extended to explain mental phenomena? How can we reconcile the diverse concepts of levels encountered in cognitive science with mechanistic levels? What role does decomposition play in explaining biological and mental phenomena, primarily as an analytical tool and also as an integral part of the mechanistic explanatory schema? Can mechanistic explanatory models incorporate the informational and representational aspects of cognitive processes? Ultimately, can the gap between psychological and neurobiological approaches to cognition be bridged with the aid of the mechanistic explanatory framework? The research unfolds across various stages, progressing from the general to the specific. This gradual specialization is reflected in the two parts of the study, the sequence of chapters, and their internal structure. The research methodologies employed to address these questions approach the subject matter from multiple angles. The study begins with conceptual mapping and analysis of the two fundamental components that constitute the research axis of the dissertation. These are the concepts of levels and decomposition, which are examined in the first two chapters. The subsequent two chapters present a comparative analysis of two explanatory models: Carl Gillett's (2016) compositional explanations and Carl Craver's (2007) new-mechanistic explanatory framework, which focuses on neuroscience, with an emphasis on constitutive explanations. These models are closely related, as they both emphasize the role of recursive decomposition leading to a hierarchy of multiple explanatory levels. These two chapters are framed by two extensive case studies. The first, presented in the third chapter, concerns compositional explanations of the bending mechanism of the knee and the physiology of muscle contraction. The second, detailed in the fourth chapter, explores the constitutive mechanistic explanation of neurobiological mechanisms of spatial memory development in mice. While the first part lays the groundwork for mechanistic explanation by initially examining levels, decomposition, and biological complexity, the second part delves into the deep waters of applying mechanistic explanations to mental phenomena. It begins by analyzing their distinctive character, which stems from information processing and intentionality -the capacity for internal representation of the world and the attribution of meaning to it. A comparative study is conducted to investigate the compatibility of levels used in cognitive science explanations with mechanistic explanatory levels, using visual recognition of an apple as a case study. The fifth chapter concludes with a negative assessment regarding levels, constituting the first major challenge to the applicability of mechanistic explanation to mental phenomena. The final chapter presents a comparative and critical discussion on the possibility of unifying psychological and mechanistic models into a common explanatory framework, highlighting the problems that arise in such an endeavor. The concept of decomposition is then revisited as an analytical tool for constructing psychological explanatory models, examined in the case of the internal visual representation of a horse. Finally, it highlights the issues that emerge when applying this to physical (neurobiological) and mental (concerning informational and representational content) entities. The chapter and the dissertation conclude with a proposal for reconciliation between psychological and neurobiological explanatory models. In this proposal, psychological models play a central role, with mechanistic explanations subsumed within them as a hierarchy of explanatory mechanisms extending across many lower levels. Each hierarchy of mechanisms implements a specific explanatory level of the psychological model, without a one-to-one correspondence between neurological and psychological elements that recursively extends to all lower levels. Concluding the study, while mechanistic explanations offer valuable insights for understanding mental phenomena, they require significant modifications to fully capture their unique characteristics. The proposed framework suggests a way to integrate psychological and neurobiological approaches to cognition without reductionism, adopting a form of interpretive pluralism that respects the autonomy of different levels and aspects of explanation while illuminating their interconnections.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Tsakiri, Amalia
  • Τσακίρη, Αμαλία

Subjects

dc:subject × 29

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/58929

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Tsakiri, Amalia; Τσακίρη, Αμαλία. Levels, decomposition and mechanistic explanation in biological systems: the case of cognitive science. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/58929