University of Thessaly (UTH)
Design and implementation of reliability aware hardware trojans and attacks
Abstract
dc:descriptionHardware security has been a great concern in the field of Integrated Circuits (IC) design in the last decades. Specifically, hardware trojans pose the greatest threat to the security of ICs. A hardware trojan is logic inserted in any design, exploiting the design's characteristics with a malicious intent. Leaking information, changing the expected behavior of the circuit, or simply terminating its function altogether are some of the most serious implications of a trojan. A category of especially detrimental hardware attacks aims at exploiting the reliability of the IC, called reliability hardware trojans. Phenomena such as Electromigration (EM) and Single Event Transient (SET) pulses can be exaggerated using a trojan to prevent the intended behavior. The former can render a path inactive earlier than the specifications, the latter can generate a soft error, which, although is a temporary error, can still disturb the functionality of the circuit. Therefore, they need to be thoroughly studied and explored. To further aid the development of satisfactory countermeasures and detection techniques, challenging and realistic benchmarks need to be generated to evaluate the aforementioned techniques. In this dissertation, three examples of hardware attacks on reliability phenomena are described. Each attack's respective hardware trojan is designed and implemented, accompanied by an algorithm to discover the optimal points of attack. The first two examples focus on exploiting the EM phenomenon, while the third focuses on the radiation-induced SET pulses and the generation of soft errors. Firstly, an attack on power grid structures to aggravate the EM phenomenon is described. The attack is achieved by removing the crucial decoupling capacitances, shortening the lifetime of the power grid. The second implements an attack on clock tree networks that accelerates the aging of a branch by adding a resistive element at the point of attack. The power grid and the clock tree are two of the main components of a chip, so an unexpected failure of them will render the whole IC non-functional. Last, a theoretical approach to implementing and injecting into a design a SET-based hardware trojan is presented. The trojan widens the glitch enough to maximize the chances a soft error will occur at the memory cell on the path it is inserted. For the first methodology, several large-scale power grid benchmarks from the OpenROAD project are used to evaluate the efficiency and validity of the method, while for the evaluation of the second, three clock tree networks with different sizes were extracted from a set of microprocessor designs with random control logic and datapath. Since this trojan is only described and not yet implemented, an increase of 15% in the SET glitch's width was applied and several of the ISCAS '98 benchmarks were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the placing technique.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Thessaly (UTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Takou, Alexandra
- Τάκου, Αλεξάνδρα
Subjects
dc:subject × 8- Ασφάλεια Υλικού Ηλεκτρονικών Υπολογιστών
- Hardware trojan viruses
- Επιστήμη Ηλεκτρολόγου Μηχανικού, Ηλεκτρονικού Μηχανικού, Μηχανικού Η/Υ
- Επιστήμες Μηχανικού και Τεχνολογία
- Υπολογιστές, Υλικό (hardware) και Αρχιτεκτονική
- Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
- Engineering and Technology
- Computer science, Hardware and Architecture
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/59195