Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Όψεις ταυτότητας στο σύστημα του Spinoza: υπόσταση, άπειροι τρόποι, άτομα
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe present dissertation addresses the problem of metaphysical identity in Spinoza’s system. The first part of the Introduction presents the problems raised by the relation between conception and identity, touching on the interrelationship between the concepts of substance and mode, attribute, essence and existence, and introducing a distinction between concept and function. The second part of the Introduction presents the interpretative foundation of our approach to Spinoza’s system, arguing that it is thoroughly characterized by a function of aspectual conception, with aspect denoting the conceptual differentiation of the object of an idea, or of the subject of a proposition, due to the dynamic conception of “one and the same thing” (the divine substance), as expressed in the text of the Ethics through a family of conjunctions, the most prominent of which is the term quatenus (insofar as). The notions of polyonymy and duality are also introduced, as additional major manifestations of the system’s aspectuality. The subject of the First chapter is an examination of Spinoza’s concepts of substance and attribute, through a contrast with the corresponding Cartesian ones. We argue that, given that Descartes’ concepts are ambiguous, by eliminating the minor Cartesian denotations and restricting these concepts to the major ones, we are led to Spinoza’s understanding of the terms. After examining the Cartesian theory of distinctions, it is argued that the function of distinction in Spinoza can be understood as an extensive application of the distinction of reasoned reason [distinctio rationis ratiocinatae], which is nevertheless strongly differentiated from its earlier philosophical expressions because of the peculiar architectonic of his system. We then proceed to sketching out Spinoza’s concepts of substance and attribute, developing three main positions: a. Spinoza implicitly adopts the Cartesian theory of the extrapolation of substantiality. b. Attributes per se are not things [res], i.e. they do not participate in causal relations as such; attributes are aspects of the substance. c. All subjects of predication in Spinoza’s system constitute aspects of reference to the ultimate subject of predication which is the unique substance (God-quatenus). The Second chapter deals with the concept of infinite modes, as the primary mode-effect of the infinite productivity of substance. We use Alain Badiou’s critique of infinite modes as a springboard, highlighting Spinoza’s understanding of infinity, numericity and (in)divisibility, which we employ to refute Badiou. We then move on to the interpretation of the infinite modes, also providing a critique of one-to-one parallelism between modes of different attributes, and utilizing Spinoza’s conception of God’s power as polyonymously identical to his essence. The Third chapter concerns the concept of the individual [individuum], as a paradigmatic case of a finite entity deeply intertwined with what has been developed thus far. After introducing the main dimensions of the problem, we contribute some thoughts on the concept of simplest bodies and on the properties of Spinozian individuals, which mainly serve as pointers for further research. Our first major conclusion is the existence of three levels of metaphysical identity in Spinoza’s system, corresponding to substance, infinite modes and finite modes. At the same time, the interaction of the different levels of identity with the functions of conception and causality lead to a problematization of certain philosophical principles, most prominently the principle of the transitivity of identity and the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, the specific nature of which, in the context of Spinozism, hinges on the generalized aspectuality of the system. In conclusion, we further develop the notion of duality, arguing that it applies to three irreducible conceptual domains, which structurally converge: [substance↔modes], [objectivity↔formality] and [essence↔existence].
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Aristotle University Of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Regkas, Stefanos
- Ρέγκας, Στέφανος
Subjects
dc:subject × 16Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/59681