National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Ο συνταγματικός πλουραλισμός στην Ευρώπη: η σχέση των εννόμων τάξεων στο πλαίσιο της ετεραρχίας
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis thesis aims to contribute to the clarification of constitutional pluralism, the assessment of its value, and its optimization as a model for regulating the relationships between legal orders. In the first introductory section, the conceptual core of constitutional pluralism is analyzed, consisting in the notions of autonomy and heterarchy of legal orders, sui generis sovereignty, and the voluntary participation of states in this multi-level structure. A brief historical overview of the phenomenon follows, from which it becomes evident that although constitutional pluralism is presented as the most innovative system, accurately reflecting the relationships between legal orders in the modern era, it is, in fact, a historical evolution of legal pluralism. This concept originated in ancient Rome, was consolidated in the context of feudalism, the Roman Catholic Church, and empires, temporarily abandoned with the rise of nation-states, and has resurfaced today, forming a cyclical pattern. Recognizing the historical continuity of the phenomenon, the second section presents the most important contemporary theories of constitutional pluralism, structured into two main schools of thought. The first reflects the theoretical discourse in Anglo-Saxon literature, and the second is built around the distinct trajectory of the German theoretical discussion. The various theories are then decoded and systematized in the light of Jaklic’s criteria. Having analyzed the most significant theoretical background of constitutional pluralism, the third section explores how case law perceives the relationships between legal orders. It then attempts to explain the different approaches taken by various courts to reach constitutional pluralism and the different degrees of its maturity in the light of three criteria: (a) the organizational, (b) the doctrinal and (c) the factual–economic criterion. Having clarified the notion of constitutional pluralism in Part A of the thesis, it becomes apparent that according to both the literature and the jurisprudence, constitutional pluralism emerges as the model that best crystallizes the system regulating relationships between legal orders in modern reality. However, the goal is not merely to prove that constitutional pluralism exists ontologically or to predict whether it will continue to exist. More crucial is to assess whether it should exist from a normative point of view. In assessing its value, the fourth section concludes that constitutional pluralism is superior to other models, such as monism and dualism. Firstly, because under this model, no legal order is completely sacrificed; all remain autonomous and coexist in parallel. In order to survive, they cultivate a spirit of mutual tolerance, respect, dialogue, and cooperation—virtues that carry value per se. The value of constitutional pluralism is maximized particularly when such cooperation and dialogue lead each legal order to adopt the positive elements of others and evolve. Another notable argument in favor of constitutional pluralism is that it is the only system that, by its very nature, takes into consideration and balances conflicting principles and values. On the one hand, it seeks to mitigate negative externalities through participation in international organizations. On the other hand, it aims to preserve the principle of democratic governance, the constitutional identity of member states, and fundamental rights. Its greatest advantage, though, lies in the rejection of an a priori and in abstracto hierarchy of legal orders and judicial fora. Instead, it puts emphasis on in concreto balancing that guarantees the sound administration of justice. On the flip side of the coin, the absence of in abstracto and a priori hierarchy leads to legal uncertainty — the Achilles’ heel of constitutional pluralism — which the two sections of Part B of the thesis aim to minimize. The core idea is that, just as dialogue in any sphere of life requires procedural rules in order to be sustainable — rules that determine who speaks and when in order to avoid chaos or prolonged silence — so too must the dialogue between legal orders be governed by procedural rules that prevent both positive and negative conflicts. In addition to procedural rules, constructive dialogue also requires commonly understood concepts. Similarly, the dialogue between legal orders must be based on certain substantive rules that facilitate mutual understanding. In an attempt to develop tools for the procedural optimization of constitutional pluralism, the fifth section examines the mechanism for ensuring respect for the principle of subsidiarity, identifies its procedural shortcomings and proposes improvements. It then explores the institution of preliminary references to the CJEU and request for advisory opinion to the ECtHR, pointing out their structural flaw consisting in the non-equal and, in any case, non-substantive role played by national courts. Despite this structural asymmetry, proposed reforms tend to focus on speeding up both procedures and improving coordination, missing the point. In this context, legal scholarship has occasionally proposed the establishment of a new procedural tool that promotes dialogue between legal orders and will be complementary to existing mechanisms. This tool, on which the fifth section focuses, is the Mixed Court. In pursuit of tools for the substantive optimization of constitutional pluralism, the sixth section first presents the principle of conferred powers. However, this principle does not function effectively as a rule for preventing and resolving conflicts between legal orders, mainly due to its easy circumvention, which stems from the vague and irrational allocation of competences, and the increased positive and negative harmonization that occurs within the EU through legislative and judicial indirect methods. The second substantive tool examined is the principle of proportionality. Ηowever, due to its polysemy — although similarly worded, the principle of proportionality is neither identical nor synonymous across legal orders, not to mention that its interpretation and application vary even within a single legal order — the aforementioned principle cannot constitute a sufficient substantive tool for genuine and constructive dialogue between legal orders. The third substantive tool is the principle of the most favourable protection, which appears to resolve conflicts only in the limited scope of human rights. As I said, it "appears" to resolve conflicts, because conflict resolution based on this principle is inherently paradoxical, since the maximization of the protection of one right inevitably entails the minimization of the protection of another. The fourth substantive rule is the duty of sincere cooperation, which likewise fails to function effectively due to its inherent vagueness and indeterminacy. The sixth section concludes with the presentation of the constitutional identity clause, as the quintessential tool for the substantive optimization of constitutional pluralism.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Biniari, Stavroula
- Μπινιάρη, Σταυρούλα
Subjects
dc:subject × 7Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/59783