National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)
Russell's theory of facts:: problems and prospects
Abstract
dc:descriptionOne of the defining features of Russell’s Logical Atomism, and more broadly of Russell’s philosophy of language, is the philosophically innovative treatment of facts as a fundamental ontological category required for a complete description of the world. A preliminary question concerns the motivations underlying Russell’s theory. What philosophical reason is there to accept—and even more to develop—such a theory? One plausible answer is that facts are introduced as entities which, when added to a traditional realist ontology, explain the otherwise problematic relations among particulars and between particulars and other entities. On this view, providing compelling reasons for accepting a Theory of Facts simultaneously supports the ontological recognition of facts themselves. Having identified a motivation for the construction of a Theory of Facts, the inquiry then turns to the question of methodological justification. A generally acceptable criterion for the admission of an ontological category, such as that of facts, is proposed, namely its overall simplicity and explanatory power in resolving a range of logical and metaphysical problems. The thesis examines whether facts satisfy this criterion, insofar as they appear to function as relata in fundamental explanatory philosophical relations — epistemic, causal, truth-making, and resemblance relations. Once the philosophical utility of facts has been established, further questions arise concerning the scope and internal structure of their various kinds. Against this background, the philosophy of Logical Atomism is outlined as the framework within which Russell advances his Theory of Facts, a theory presented as profoundly intertwined with his philosophy of mathematics and logic. The traditional interpretation of Logical Atomism offered by David Pears has recently been subjected to criticism, particularly for emphasizing structural affinities between Russell’s theory and Humean empiricism. The thesis investigates the grounds for Pears’s claim and locates them in Russell’s acceptance of an epistemological principle—the Principle of Acquaintance. It is argued, however, that this principle admits of a naturalistic modification that allows it to withstand the objections raised against it. The investigation then turns to the two principal arguments by which Russell defends the inclusion of facts as a fundamental ontological category. A formal argument and a line of reasoning is developed in support of the claim that ontology enjoys priority over the language used to describe it. Moreover, accepting facts as ontologically fundamental requires a critical reassessment of a widely endorsed interpretation of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, according to which the admissible entities of a theory are determined solely by the values of bound variables in existentially quantified statements required to formulate the theory in first-order logic. The thesis proposes an expansion of this criterion to include not only a theory’s explicit commitments, but also its implicit commitments, as these arise from the explanatory roles played by facts in truth-making theories. On this basis, Russell’s Theory of Facts is located within the category of implicit ontological commitments, justified by its explanatory power within a correspondence theory of truth of the kind defended by Russell. In addition, an argument is developed for the central importance of the first-order language of Principia Mathematica to questions concerning the nature and kinds of facts recognized by Russell. The reasons for Russell’s introduction of predicate logic are examined, with particular emphasis on its capacity to accommodate a wider range of arguments than traditional logic. Logical considerations and proofs are then presented to argue for the ontological economy afforded by adopting predicate logic. Once predicate logic is accepted, the problem of the truth of quantified general propositions immediately arises. Russell maintains that general propositions are not reducible to sequences of atomic propositions. The inferential rules of predicate logic that support this claim are examined, and arguments are offered in its defence particularly in the context of Russell’s disagreement with Wittgenstein on this issue. The acceptance of quantified general propositions therefore supports the admission of general facts as their corresponding truthmakers. It is then argued that the inclusion of truth-making negative facts—as articulated in Russell’s dispute with Demos during the period of the Logical Atomism lectures—is the position most consistent with the principles of Logical Atomism. A new interpretation is proposed that accommodates pre-theoretical intuitions concerning the understanding of both positive and negative properties. This modification leads to the acceptance of negative facts within the atomistic ontology and, consequently, to a more complete account of the mechanisms of truth-making and false-making. The discussion then turns to a recent interpretation of belief facts proposed by David Bostock, arguing that such facts are best accounted for within the framework of Russell’s Theory of Types. Finally, the well-known slingshot argument is examined and shown to be ineffective once a Russellian theory of descriptions is adopted.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)
- Year dc:date
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Plithas, Evangelos
- Πλήθας, Ευάγγελος
Subjects
dc:subject × 38- Μπέρτραντ Ράσσελ
- Λογικός ατομισμός
- Γεγονότα
- Θεωρία περιγραφών
- Λογικοσημασιολογικές σχέσεις
- Αρχή της γνωριμίας
- Οντολογικές δεσμεύσεις
- Τετράγωνο της αντίθεσης
- Κατηγορηματική λογική
- Γενικά γεγονότα
- Αρνητικά γεγονότα
- Φιλοσοφία της γλώσσας
- Φιλοσοφική λογική
- Μεταφυσική
- Ιστορία της Αναλυτικής Φιλοσοφίας
- Οντολογική ουδετερότητα
- Bertrand Russell
- Logical atomism
- Facts
- Theory of Descriptions
- Logicosemantic relations
- Principle of Acquaintance
- Ontological Commitments
- Ontological Neutrality
- Square of opposition
- Predicate logic
- General Facts
- Negative Facts
- Philosophy of language
- Philosophical logic
- Metaphysics
- History of Analytic Philosophy
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/60891