Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences
Οι πολιτικοστρατιωτικές σχέσεις και η επίδρασή τους στη στρατηγική αξιολόγηση
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe central problem in civil-military relations comprises two dimensions: how to build and sustain an armed force that is subject to political control yet remains effective and efficient. This dissertation focuses on the second dimension—a subject that has received comparatively less attention, both internationally and in Greece. It offers a historical and theoretical survey of civil-military relations, emphasizing the need to balance political oversight with military effectiveness. A pivotal figure in this theoretical framework is Clausewitz, who famously argued that war is “the continuation of politics by other means,” rejecting the view of war as an autonomous technical domain. For Clausewitz, strategic planning demands cooperation between political and military leadership, with clear guidance from the political authorities coupled with an awareness of operational constraints. By contrast, Jomini advocated a strict separation of political and military spheres, favoring a technocratic approach to warfare under military control. Huntington’s theory of “objective civilian control” aimed to secure the professional autonomy of the armed forces while ensuring their complete subordination to political leadership. However, its implementation faltered in conflicts such as Vietnam and Iraq, largely due to inadequate coordination. Historically, the modern era witnessed the consolidation of political institutions under liberal models alongside the development of military structures such as general staffs, inspired by the Prussian prototype. The first major clashes between political and military leadership emerged during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), with Bismarck representing political rationality and Moltke embodying the military tradition. During the First World War, the absence of institutional dialogue between civilian and military authorities led to operational failures. In France and Britain, political control was gradually established, whereas in Germany military authoritarianism prevailed. In the Second World War, Britain achieved a model of effective cooperation under Churchill, while France faltered due to institutional dysfunction. The United States developed new coordination mechanisms, whereas the Soviet Union, under Stalin’s centralized leadership, combined authoritarianism with operational effectiveness. National Socialist Germany, by contrast, suffered strategic setbacks as a result of irrational command structures and Hitler’s dismantling of the professional military leadership. The Greek experience offers a particularly instructive case: from the absence of strategic command during the Balkan Wars and the Asia Minor Campaign, to institutional advances in the interwar period under Papagos and the functioning of military staffs in the Greco-Italian War. The 1974 Cyprus crisis revealed severe institutional and leadership shortcomings, a lack of strategic coordination, and political indecisiveness. The continued failure to establish a National Security Council remains a critical gap in Greece’s strategic framework. This dissertation argues that strategy is not solely determined by individual leaders but is fundamentally shaped by institutional structures. Without robust institutional dialogue, friction between political and military leadership is inevitable. The failure of 1974 and subsequent partisan interference in the leadership of the Armed Forces underscore the need for genuine professionalism and constructive civil-military cooperation to ensure national security in a consistent, effective, and ethically responsible manner.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Gkartzonikas, Panagiotis
- Γκαρτζονίκας, Παναγιώτης
Subjects
dc:subject × 18- Πολιτικοστρατιωτικές σχέσεις
- Πολιτικοστρατιωτικοί θεσμοί
- Ανώτατη διεύθυνση του πολέμου
- Ανώτατη διοίκηση
- Στρατηγική
- Clausewitz
- Huntington
- Civil-military relations
- Civil-military institutions
- Higher direction of war
- Supreme command
- Strategy
- Πολιτικές Επιστήμες
- Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες
- Διεθνείς σχέσεις
- Political Science
- Social Sciences
- International Relations
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/61381