University of Crete (UOC)
Τελειότητα, Ελευθερία και Αναγκαιότητα: μια κριτική εξέταση της φιλοσοφίας του Λάιμπνιτς
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe basic aim of the dissertation is not merely to illuminate a particular issue within Leibnizian metaphysics, but to reconstruct, from a synthetic perspective, a network of concepts that lies at the core of Leibniz’s philosophy: perfection, freedom, and necessity. The central hypothesis of the dissertation is that these concepts should not be examined in isolation, but as internally articulated elements of a single and coherent logico-metaphysical structure. The problem from which the dissertation begins is already familiar from the Aristotelian discussion of tomorrow’s sea battle. If every proposition referring to future events already has a determinate truth-value, then free action seems, in a crucial sense, to be called into question. In early modern philosophy and theology, and especially in Leibniz, this problem acquires greater depth. For here predetermination is grounded not merely in the principle of bivalence, but in the concept of God as ens perfectissimum. Divine omniscience, as perfect knowledge, allows for no indeterminacy in the truth-value of any proposition; and precisely for this reason, the predetermination of future events appears to create a tension with the basic constituents of freedom, namely understanding and contingency, giving rise to two serious threats: first, a form of fatalism that may lead to moral inaction; and second, a necessitarian condition that seems to exclude contingency. The dissertation is organized precisely around this tension: how can perfection, which grounds the predetermination of the truth-value of all propositions, fail to annul the possibility of freedom? The starting point of the research is that the conceptual relation between perfection and freedom, as well as its consequences within the Leibnizian system, has not received sufficient and systematic treatment in contemporary scholarship. This scholarship often either overemphasizes the notion of the complete concept of the individual substance, thereby leading to superessentialist readings, or treats as competing two basic strategies employed by Leibniz himself for preserving freedom: on the one hand, “per se possibility,” and, on the other, “infinite analysis” or, more precisely, “non-demonstrability.” One of the central aims of the dissertation is to show that such readings overlook the inherent possibilities for reconciling predetermination and freedom within Leibniz’s own thought. More specifically, the main thesis of the dissertation is twofold. First, these two strategies are not competing but complementary, because they respond to different aspects of the same problem. Per se possibility provides the logico-metaphysical basis of contingency, while non-demonstrability provides the epistemological answer to the practical consequences of predetermination, and especially to the threat of the lazy reason. Second, Leibnizian modality should not be interpreted primarily through external semantic frameworks, but through internal logico-metaphysical criteria.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Crete (UOC)
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Volakakis, Stylianos
- Βολακάκης, Στυλιανός
Subjects
dc:subject × 19- Λάιμπνιτς, Γκότφριντ Βίλχελμ
- Λογική, Τροπική Λογική
- Ηθική φιλοσοφία
- Φιλοσοφία της γλώσσας
- Μεταφυσική
- Θεολογία
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
- Logic, Modal Logic
- Ethics
- Philosophy of language
- Metaphysics
- Theology
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Ηθική
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/61499