Abstract
dc:descriptionThis essay seeks to understand the nature of particular properties (tropes), if they are to serve as the fundamental bricks out of which both the objects of everyday experience (like a chair or a car) and of science (like an atom or an electron) are to be constructed. As with properties in general, so particular properties can either be monadic (like e.g. this redness) or n-adic (like e.g. this relation of love between John and Mary), each with its own role to play in the metaphysical construction of objects. In this context, the starting point of this investigation is R. Garcia’s distinction between modifier and module particular properties, i.e. between modifier and module tropes. In the first case, modifier tropes have a purely functional nature, conveying a certain characteristic to some entity (its sphericality, for example, or its redness) without themselves being so charactered by the characteristic they convey. In the second case, module tropes convey a characteristic to some entity while themselves being so charactered by the characteristic they convey. This is to say that they are themselves spherical or red etc., as a result rendering the entity they are a part of spherical of red.Of these two kinds of properties, I’ll try to show that particular properties should be understood as module rather than modifier and, specifically, as characters, i.e. as particular rednesses, sphericalities etc. Module tropes or characters are related by a particular fusion relation in order to compose the various objects of everyday experience and science. Objects, in this case, are nothing but bundles of tropes, where the particularity of the tropesguarantees the particularity of the objects. A significant part of this work is then going to be dedicated in defending this idea of module tropes being the fundamental components of objects. I will try to show that (M) module tropes, when fused, can indeed provide us with a cohesive account of the metaphysical composition of the objects of experience and science. In order to achieve that, I will first discuss some of Garcia’s relevant objections and carry on by articulating somebasic principle of (module) trope mereology.(M), however, faces other kinds of problems as well. One of these has to do with particular relations in general and is due to Herbert Hochberg. According to Hochberg, who ties particularity to spatiotemporality, relations cannot be particular because, as he tries to show, they cannot be spatiotemporal. I try to address this and other objections by considering, among other things, a different understanding of particularity altogether.Another type of problem that afflicts all kinds of relations (i.e. both universal and particular relations) is Bradley’s Regress: If the relatedness between two or more entities requires the existence of a relation that obtains between them and if that relation is itself an entity, then it seems that this relation will have itself to be related to the entities it relates. But if that’s the case then the additional relation that plays this role will also have to be related to the entities it relates and so on and so forth ad infinitum. The upshot is that in order for there to be relatedness between entities, an infinite number of relations will have to be postulated first, which leads Bradley to conclude that relatedness between entities isn’t but an appearance and not reality. I try to address this kind of problem, first by raising certain objections against the relevant solutions of D.W. Mertz, A.-S. Maurin and W.F. Vallicella (and trying to show how we shouldn’t understand the nature of particular relations if we are to address Bradley’s Regress) and second by distinguishing between how a relation succeeds in relating its relata and how an account can be given for that relation’s relating of the specific relata it does relate.The idea here is that if these two issues are distinguished, the relation theorist can propose both a different understanding of relations in general (i.e. understand relations as active and not as contingent links between entities) as well as individual empirical explanations for how specific relations relate the entities they in fact relate. Based on the previous discussion about relations, I also try to show that particular relations are to be conceived as module rather than modifier, in this way integrating them in the already existent conceptual framework of module and modifier properties. Finally, I discuss some general objections against particular properties, in order to show that their two main features, i.e. their particularity and their abstractness, have an indispensable role to play in trope metaphysics. I complete my discussion by concluding that trope theory remains a very competitive metaphysical theory, indeed the most competitive metaphysical theory right now.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Krontiras, Iasonas
- Κροντήρας, Ιάσονας
Subjects
dc:subject × 16- Μεταφυσική και οντολογία
- Πρόβλημα των καθόλου
- Ατομικές ιδιότητες
- Μερεολογία
- Η άπειρη αναδρομή του Μπράντλεϋ
- Metaphysics and ontology
- Problem of universals
- Tropes
- Mereology
- Bradley's regress
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Φιλοσοφία
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Philosophy
Rights
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/61509