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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Forms of explanation in developmental biology

Abstract

dc:description

This PhD thesis is guided by a single unifying motivation: to bridge the gap between conceptual approaches in philosophy of science and the epistemic practices of contemporary developmental biology. Against top-down accounts that impose abstract normative frameworks on scientific practice and rigid formal requirements on what qualifies as bona fide scientific explanation, my dissertation advances the methodological principle that philosophical adequacy must be earned through close engagement with the actual scientific practice, via which biologists discover, use, test and justify their explanations. In this sense, my central claim defended throughout this thesis is that New Mechanism, when properly interpreted and refined, offers the most adequate and complete account of explanation in developmental biology, precisely because it descriptively corresponds to the research strategies, methods and experimental regimes through which developmental mechanisms are uncovered, tested, corroborated and controlled. The overarching aim of my thesis is specified by four interrelated objectives. First, to examine whether a general definition of biological development (ontogeny) is both feasible and needed. Second, to evaluate and further develop the framework of New Mechanism as a comprehensive approach to both etiological and constitutive explanations in developmental biology. Third, to analyse case studies of mechanistic explanations that function as exemplars within this scientific field, in order to gain a more adequate understanding of the nature of developmental mechanisms. Fourth, and finally, to open up a new perspective towards a unified account of the forms of explanation in contemporary developmental biology. The first major contribution of my dissertation concerns the concept of biological development. In Chapter 2 I propose a novel operational definition of biological development that is deliberately modest. Rather than aiming to capture a metaphysical essence, the definition is designed as a tool sensitive to scientific practice. This approach encapsulates a central theme of my thesis: philosophical approaches to scientific concepts must be accountable to the ways in which those concepts are used by scientists. In Chapters 3 and 4, I develop the philosophical framework that underpins the remainder of the thesis, namely a neo-mechanistic conception of scientific explanation. In Chapter 3 I examine New Mechanism’s model of mechanistic etiological explanation and defend its causal-centric orientation against the deductive-nomological (DN) model. In addition, I argue in favour of an interventionist account of etiological relevance based on approximately ideal interventions. In this way, it is shown that etiological relevance can be identified without requiring fully ideal interventions, that is, through targeted and controlled interventions of the kind commonly employed in experimental practice. In Chapter 4 I extend this interventionist analysis to mechanistic constitutive explanation. From this perspective, I address one of the most controversial issues in neo-mechanistic philosophy: how mechanisms are decomposed into their working parts and how the constitutive relevance of those parts gets experimentally established. Chapter 5 constitutes the empirical core of my dissertation. More specifically, through a detailed analysis of paradigmatic case studies in developmental biology, I illustrate how mechanistic explanations are used within actual research practices. These case studies demonstrate that developmental explanations are typically structured around mechanisms that are discovered, tested and refined through controllable and repeatable experimental interventions. This Chapter provides strong evidence that the neo-mechanistic framework is not only applicable to developmental biology but fully captures its main epistemological features. In Chapter 6, I generalize and extend the above findings in order to address the problem of explanatory integration. According to my neo-mechanistic account developed here, the required integration is not achieved by aggregating all known causes of a phenomenon, but through the selection of only those factors that coherently participate in the operation of the mechanism responsible for the explanandum. Another major contribution of Chapter 6 is my defence of the historical character of biological explanations. I argue that explanatory success in biology does not rest on nomological subsumption, but on spatiotemporally located mechanisms that have been shaped over time through contingent evolutionary trajectories and developmental pathways, that is, historical circumstances. This historical dimension makes possible a refined account of biological functions as evolutionarily established properties of mechanisms. The Chapter concludes by highlighting a new perspective for integrating proximate and ultimate biological explanations within the neo-mechanistic framework. Viewed as a whole, my dissertation shows that developmental biology is not merely a privileged field of application for (neo-)mechanistic philosophy, but also a source of insight into the nature and characteristics of mechanistic explanation itself. At the same time, it advances a neo-mechanistic conception of scientific explanation that is realist without being reductionist, integrative without being superficial, and philosophical without losing contact with the reality of experimental practice. Ultimately, I argue that progress in the philosophical treatment of scientific explanation depends on continuous engagement with scientific practice, and that the gap between conceptual analysis and epistemic practices can be bridged not by downgrading philosophy or idealizing science, but by allowing each to inform and critically examine the other

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Year dc:date
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Silvestros, Pavlos
  • Σιλβέστρος, Παύλος

Subjects

dc:subject × 24

Rights

Language dc:language
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
10.12681/eadd/61538

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Greek National Archive of PhD Theses
Base URL
phdtheses.ekt.gr/eadd_oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Silvestros, Pavlos; Σιλβέστρος, Παύλος. Forms of explanation in developmental biology. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2026. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/61538