National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Ιστορία, ενδεχομενικότητα, και αναγκαιότητα στη φιλοσοφία του πρώιμου Wittgenstein
Abstract
dc:descriptionIn the Tractatus, there prevails a peculiar silence surrounding history. For example, we do not see its author engaging in dialogue with the history of philosophy, nor treating other philosophers as historical figures. Indeed, the word “history” does not even appear in the text. At the same time, however, and upon closer inspection, we also observe a strong resistance to the idea of a substantive or synthetic a priori or, roughly equivalently, a resistance to the idea of the existence of necessary facts; conversely, we find an acceptance of the idea that all facts are contingent. The question that therefore arises is this: what status does the concept of necessity ultimately have in the Tractatus? For if there is something that appears to interest the author of the work, it is not the contingent features of language and the world, but rather their necessary features, their shared “logical form.” The aim of the present dissertation is to investigate this peculiar combination of attitudes in the author of the Tractatus—namely, his strong resistance both to historical modes of thinking and to the idea of a substantive a priori. My research combines elements of historical and interpretative study. That is, I attempt not only to present these two attitudes, but also to clarify their historical roots. I believe that such a method is useful, if not necessary, for the interpretation of a work as difficult and variously interpreted as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. More specifically, in the first chapter I attempt to investigate the philosophical life of the Austrian philosopher before he “officially” began his philosophical career, that is, before he went to Cambridge in 1911 to study philosophy under Russell. Thanks to the important work of his biographers, we now know far more about his early philosophical life than we did thirty years ago, and probably more than even those who personally associated with him knew. Nevertheless, I attempt to emphasize the anti-historical sentiments of the thinkers who influenced him, in particular those of Schopenhauer and Weininger, while also pointing out that among his early influences there was at least one thinker—Boltzmann—who promoted a notion of a historical a priori. In the second chapter, I investigate the development of the Austrian philosopher’s thought from the moment he arrived in Cambridge until the completion of the Tractatus in 1918. My main objective is to show that from the beginning of his time in Cambridge, and throughout the period documented in the surviving pre-Tractatus manuscripts, he consistently and unwaveringly held the view that logic—and philosophy insofar as it is logic—is not a science, that is, not a cognitive or factual discipline, as Frege and Russell believed. In the third chapter, I raise the following question: given the overall thought of the author of the Tractatus, what role does he assign, or ought he to assign, to historical questions, explanations, and forms of reasoning in philosophy? My answer is that although he occasionally employs historical ideas for the purpose of philosophical clarification, his entirely unhistorical treatment of these ideas, together with the complete detachment of the “philosophical self” from the historical world, supports a broad form of anti-historicism according to which historical “self-consciousness” is dysfunctional for proper philosophical thinking. In the fourth chapter, I attempt to answer the question of what kind of thing the logical form of the world is. The logical form of the world is supposed to determine a priori how things in the world can be, and, insofar as the meaning of a proposition is a possible state of affairs, it also determines the range of what can be said. But what kind of thing can this be? My answer is that it is not some kind of thing and, consequently, not something in relation to which there are facts. If it resembles anything, it resembles a feature of the world, a pattern instantiated by the world’s facts, rather than something with which the facts must conform, and, still less, something with which they could come into conflict. Such an answer is, of course, compatible with the idea that it is a feature of the world itself. Nevertheless, I argue that in the work the concept of possibility has some sort of dependence on symbolic representation. To put the matter in terms of a “tracking epistemology”, although a picture or proposition attempts to track a fact—that is, how things are in the world—it in no way attempts to track its own sense, namely, how things can be. Consequently, it would be mistaken to think that when the author says that a proposition shows its sense, the verb “shows” is a verb that implies reference or directedness. The sense of a proposition is something immanent within it, and not something with which the proposition is correlated. Accordingly, it would also be mistaken to think that the famous picture theory of meaning—according to which every meaningful proposition represents a possible or contingent state of affairs—is based on some kind of modal realism. The chapter concludes with the question of whether the picture theory of meaning is intended to encourage a scientific or positivistic attitude toward the world. My answer is that the Tractatus does not seek to restrict the role of the subject to that of producing correct or incorrect representations of the world. Quite the contrary. Its purpose—and the purpose of the complete detachment of the philosophical self from the historical world—is to show us that another attitude toward the world is available to us as well, one with an ethical and aesthetic dimension: namely, that of seeing the world from the perspective of eternity. Finally, in the conclusion of the dissertation, I briefly examine the historical and philosophical significance of the author’s attitude toward the historical mode of thinking, including its influence on his later work.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Loukos, Constantinos
- Λούκος, Κωνσταντίνος
Subjects
dc:subject × 14Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/61539