Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH)
Μικρασιατική Εκστρατεία 1919-1922: οι επιχειρήσεις της Στρατιάς Μικράς Ασίας το θέρος του 1922, συνολική θεώρηση και ανάλυση του αμυντικού αγώνα της
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe purpose of this paper is to analyze, evaluate and draw conclusions from the defensive operations of the Army of Asia Minor during the summer of 1922. The term defensive operations in military science encompasses both static defense operations, i.e. area defense, and retreat operations. The period under consideration is delimited from the launch of the final attack of the Western Front forces on August 13th, until the date of the withdrawal of the last military unit of the Southern Group from Asia Minor, on September 3rd, 1922. The analysis focuses on the orders issued by the Army of Asia Minor throughout the course of the operations, as it acted both at the strategic and the operational level, as well as on those issued by A and B Army Corps, which formed the Southern Group. The assessment of these operations leading to the formulation of conclusions is based on evidence drawn from the sciences of International Relations, Strategic Studies, Military History and Military Science. The assessment is also based on the war theories of Clausewitz and Jomini existing at that time, which were taught in the War Academy of Germany (Berlin) and France (Paris).Greek officers were sent to these Academies to qualify as staff officers. Consequently, these theories were known at least to the senior staff officers of the Army, who were graduates of these Academies and who were responsible for the planning and direction of operations, at the strategic and operational level. This study also evaluates the manner in which the Army of Asia Minor and the Southern Group planned, conducted, and directed their operations, the outcomes of the successive westward withdrawals carried out by the forces of the Southern Group, as well as the operational concept adopted by the Western Front during its offensive operation. The influence of Soviet military doctrine on the organization, training, and operational planning of Kemal’s offensive campaign is also examined. The study further evaluates whether the Army of Asia Minor was capable of achieving the political objectives of the war and whether the military objectives underpinning the defensive operations had been properly defined. The defensive operations resulted in the defeat of the Army of Asia Minor, since it was impossible from the outset to defend an extensive front of 750 kilometers in length, with insufficient forces, without provision for defense in depth and without the existence of adequate strategic reserves, in areas from which they could intervene in a timely manner in the defensive battle. Kemal’s forces succeeded in achieving overwhelming superiority in both space and time, thereby surprising the Greek command, which, lacking an effective battlefield intelligence collection system, was unable to accurately assess the capabilities of the forces deployed by the Western Front. Furthermore, the Army’s headquarters, located 400 kilometers from the defensive line, was physically incapable of exercising effective operational control or reinforcing the Southern Group during the engagement. This limitation was compounded by the fact that the Army of Asia Minor subordinated its only strategic reserve force, Β Army Corps, to the A Army Corps, and thus never taking it under its direct command.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH)
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Matzakos, Andreas
- Ματζάκος, Ανδρέας
Subjects
dc:subject × 16Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/61658