National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Ο καταλογισμός ηθικής ευθύνης το θεμελιωδέστερο καθήκον προς εαυτόν: μια καντιανή προσέγγιση
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis dissertation investigates the concept of imputation in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, with the aim of clarifying the conditions under which human beings are held responsible both for their actions and for the choice of their maxims, which ought to incorporate ends that are also duties. The investigation begins from the Doctrine of Virtue of the Metaphysics of Morals as an applied normative theory, in whose light it returns to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, but also to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, in order to bring out the internal coherence of Kantian thought with regard to the connection between transcendental freedom, the moral law and responsibility. The central thesis of the dissertation is that imputation is not limited to particular actions but extends to the deeper level of free power of choice and disposition, whose moral quality is determined by the unending conflict between two active opposing forces (negative magnitudes): the predisposition to the good and the propensity to radical evil. The formation of a virtuous disposition requires the ongoing performance of duties of virtue. Special emphasis is placed on the dual nature of the feeling of respect, which objectively accompanies the moral law and subjectively motivates the agent to perform good deeds. The dissertation also advances the view that conscience, too, has a dual function: both affective/motivating and cognitive. In the former respect, it sensitizes the power of choice to incorporate the feeling of respect as an incentive in its maxims. In the latter respect, as moral power of judgment, it constitutes the internal court in man that makes possible both prospective moral deliberation and retrospective self-ascription of responsibility. A methodological presupposition of the analysis is the fundamental transcendental distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal self, through which the Kantian conception of freedom as causality is grounded and, consequently, the possibility of imputation is established. The dissertation argues that Kant’s later practical philosophy offers a guiding model for human beings to harmonize their convictions, ends, and actions, in undertaking the duties of virtue: their own perfection and the happiness of others. The work is organized into four parts, seven chapters, and five appendices, which successively develop the central concepts of the Theory of Virtue, the imputation of the choice of ends that are also duties, the disposition as the highest level of imputation, and finally conscience as the core concept of Kant’s theory of responsibility.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Authors dc:creator
-
- Bouki, Tereza Thiresia
- Μπούκη, Τερέζα-Θηρεσία
Subjects
dc:subject × 26- Καταλογισμός
- Ηθικός νόμος
- Φρόνημα
- Ελεύθερη προαίρεση
- Σκοπός που είναι συγχρόνως καθήκον
- Καταβολή για το αγαθό
- Ριζικό κακό
- Συναίσθημα σεβασμού
- Ηθική συνείδηση
- Ηθική κριτική δύναμη
- Imputation
- Moral law
- Disposition
- Free power of choice
- End that is also a duty
- Predisposition to the good
- Radical evil
- Feeling of respect
- CONSCIENCE
- Moral power of judgment
- Φιλοσοφία, Ηθική και Θρησκεία
- Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες και Τέχνες
- Ηθική
- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
- Humanities and the Arts
- Ethics
Rights
- Language dc:language
- gre
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- 10.12681/eadd/61813