Back to search

University of Kent,

Moral objectivity: Kant, Hume and psychopathy

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Moral objectivity is about genuinely better or worse courses of action and states of affairs in the moral domain. It seems good to aim at an identification of objective moral justifications that is maximally independent of subjectivity (at least if the threat of relativism is to be avoided). Having said that, it seems problematic to accept objective discriminations or justifications that are devoid of subjectivity. Every account of objective moral justifications seems in need of some sort of relationship with naturalistic human minds. How else could such justifications enter the universe? In this study I build towards arguments for deciding when claims about the status of moral objectivity are overambitious. I offer three lines of argument that point to moral objectivity being essentially anti-realist and (as such) mind-dependent. The first is grounded in Hume's (exclusively psychological) conception of 'reason'. It is paradigmatically well illustrated by Kant's philosophy. The second and third lines of argument are grounded in research about the nature and etiology of psychopathy. The second is about conceptual relativity regarding normative judgements about good practical lives. The third is about libertarian freedom over innately given components, components crucial to the psychological possibility of taking account of others in evaluative decision-making. Due to conceptual and empirical problems about (possible worlds of) human nature, which will be laid out, these two lines of argument need further conceptual and empirical attention. Additional to my constructive theory about the limits of moral objectivity, my study contains a critical reflection on methodological aspects of the contemporary meta-ethical debate. Overall, my study is a critical call for better reflection on the concept 'reason' and a deeper involvement with theoretical claims about human nature.

Degree

thesis:*
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
mphil
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Kent,
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jansen, Claudia
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Kirchin, Simon T.
  • Corfield, David

Rights

Language dc:language
en

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Kent
Base URL
kar.kent.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Jansen, Claudia. Moral objectivity: Kant, Hume and psychopathy. mphil thesis, University of Kent,, 2018.