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University of Kent,

The Politics of Fiscal Monitoring

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The last decade saw a rise in the number of expert bodies with a public mandate to monitor fiscal policy, aiming at mitigating the alleged overspending bias of politicians. In contrast to the existing literature this thesis claims that policy monitoring is inherently political. I develop an understanding of policy watchdog bodies as non-majoritarian institutions and emphasise the reciprocal nature between policymakers and the experts serving in these bodies. The Politics of Fiscal Monitoring approach developed here acknowledges that the origins, structure and remits of fiscal watchdog bodies as well as the selection of and responsiveness to its experts are driven by political strategies and compromise. Based on a new dataset this thesis demonstrates in three distinct research articles and a research note that the monitoring capacity of fiscal watchdog bodies can be traced back to its political roots; that policymakers select watchdog experts based on political loyalty; and that elected officials are more responsive to experts if their advice is politically beneficial.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
phd
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Kent,
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Belling, Benjamin Daniel Sebastian
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Morgan-Jones, Edward
  • Grundig, Frank

Rights

Language dc:language
en

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Kent
Base URL
kar.kent.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Belling, Benjamin Daniel Sebastian. The Politics of Fiscal Monitoring. doctoral thesis, University of Kent,, 2020.