Back to search

McMaster University

The Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>Perhaps the most puzzling of the mind-body issues is the problem about the nature of the felt qualities or "raw-feels" of experience. Most philosophic positions on the mind-body problem - materialism, mind-body interactionism, evalutionary energent theories, epiphernomenalism, neutral monism - are positions taken in answer to this problem. The scope and content of this thesis is limited to examining one such position - the current identity theory that raw-feels are identical with physiological occurrences.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
1969

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jones, Kenneth
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Radner, Michael

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/5745
6769
2137918

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
McMaster University
Base URL
macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Jones, Kenneth. The Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences. 1969. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10717