Abstract
dc:description.abstract<p>Perhaps the most puzzling of the mind-body issues is the problem about the nature of the felt qualities or "raw-feels" of experience. Most philosophic positions on the mind-body problem - materialism, mind-body interactionism, evalutionary energent theories, epiphernomenalism, neutral monism - are positions taken in answer to this problem. The scope and content of this thesis is limited to examining one such position - the current identity theory that raw-feels are identical with physiological occurrences.</p>
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Philosophy
- Year dc:date.issued
- 1969
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Jones, Kenneth
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Radner, Michael
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier URI
- https://doi.org/10.71548/18653
- Dc Identifier Other
-
opendissertations/5745
6769
2137918