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McMaster University

Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>We study the application of reputation as an instigator of beneficial user behavior in selfish routing and when the network users rely on the network coordinator for information about the network. Instead of using tolls or artificial delays, the network coordinator takes advantage of the users' insufficient data, in order to manipulate them through the information he provides. The issue that arises then is what can be the coordinator's gain without compromising by too much on the trust the users put on the information provided, i.e., by maintaining a reputation for (at least some) trustworthiness.</p> <p>Our main contribution is the modeling of such a system as a repeated game of incomplete information in the case of single-commodity general networks. This allows us to apply known folk-like theorems to get bounds on the price of anarchy that are better than the well-known bounds without information manipulation.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Computing and Software
Year dc:date.issued
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hu, Kun
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Karakostas, George

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/7845
8899
4168807

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
McMaster University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
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citation

Hu, Kun. Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13009