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McMaster University

Relativism and the Demise of Epistemic Foundations

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to show that the anti-foundationalism of philosophers like Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty does not, as is commonly thought, entail relativism. Consequently, anti-foundationalists of this stripe are not vulnerable to the myriad arguments brought against the doctrine of relativism.</p> <p>Both foundationalism and relativism, it is argued, suppose that there is something (direct awareness of concrete states of affairs, intuitive self evidence, etc, on the one hand; power, consensus, coherence, etc. on the other) which 'makes truths true'. The anti-foundationalist, on the contrary, maintains that nothing does so. Central to establishing the plausibility of this view are the arguments employed by Donald Davidson against the dualism of conceptual scheme(s) and empirical content--a distinction upon which both the foundationalism of the empiricist tradition, and conceptual relativism, rely.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
1990

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Williams, Owen Mark
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Allen, Barry

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/8575
9650
4861131

Chain of custody

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McMaster University
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Last updated
2026-11-18
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citation

Williams, Owen Mark. Relativism and the Demise of Epistemic Foundations. 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13746