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McMaster University

Frege's Theory of Judgement

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

<p>This thesis attempts to examine and evaluate the contribution made by the German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) to the solution of certain epistemological problems which centre round the notion of a judgement. It is argued that it is in terms of such Fregean concepts as those of assertion, sense, reference, object and concept that an adequate account of the nature of human judgement is to be formulated, but that Frege's theory must undergo substantial modification before it is finally acceptable. The conclusion herein reached is that a judgement is an assertion that a given object falls under a certain concept (or that a given concept falls within a certain concept of higher order). Just this was, indeed, Frege's claim; but it is argued that certain key terms here cannot be understood as Frege originally intended; and an alternative interpretation is propounded and defended. This interpretation is specifically directed towards the notions of a sense-function and the unsaturatedness of concepts.</p>

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
1975

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bell, Andrew David
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Wilson, N.L.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Other
opendissertations/901
1697
949311

Chain of custody

source
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McMaster University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-18
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citation

Bell, Andrew David. Frege's Theory of Judgement. 1975. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/14185