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McMaster University

William James's Will to Believe Revisited

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to defend William James's will to believe doctrine from the main lines of criticism which have been leveled against it throughout the last century. Principal among such criticisms are accusations that James fideistically advocated an intrusion of the subject into doxastic practice which opens the door to wishful thinking, and that he confused belief and hypothesis-adoption. My defense of James against such charges will be based upon analyses of two important but neglected components of his position--the "liveness" of certain options and propositions, and the "strenuous mood''-and upon a contextualization of the role assigned by James to "passional nature" within the terms of reference of his work on immediate experience.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
1996

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Brown, Hunter
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Najm, S.

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
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McMaster University
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
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citation

Brown, Hunter. William James's Will to Believe Revisited. 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/15531